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AX DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 1938 TERM
Roger John Traynor
Professor of Law, University of California
There is no ceVg'al connection between the growing
revenue needs of government and the theories of'.taxation
underlying the decisions of' the Supreme Court, but it is an
unmistakable reflection of the times that the tax de-cisions
of the 1938 term have set a new pace in the liberalization of
old restrictions upon the taxing power of both the federal and
state governments...Such a change as the breakdown of the
immunity of government salaries f'rom taxation, because of its
timeliness in spreading the costs of government to that grow*-
ing segment of the population engaged in its work, make vivid
to all.-taxpayers and most of all to the new ones their fi'-
nancial.responsibility to their governments.
The time-honored phrase that the power to tax involves
the power to destroy, which had already lost much of its Old
Testament sound and fury, ceased to have the power of an
i'ncanation against the march of decisions concerned less with
undue exercise-of the government's power to tax than with undue
immunities of many citizens from their obligations to support
their governments. There was less emphasis on tax burdens and
more on tax avoidance. When the court* re'-opened the way to
guIti-state taxation of' intangibles, when it ref'used to pro-
ane z exclusive blessing on the common-law dootrine of' a
- 1-
single domicile, when it danced intricate verbal figures
through the maze .of restrictions which had long surrounded
the taxation of interstate commerce, when it re-examined
certain doctrines.and abandonted others, it set the con-
ditions- for-a new emphasis in taxation upoh the obligation
of citizens to support the governments whose protection they
enj oy.
Fourteenth Amendment
The extent of permissible multi-state taxation of
intangibles varies with the changing membership of the
Supreme Court. Before 1930 it was widely permissible.
Several decisions had upheld it in one form or another,.
but in that year, in Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minne-
!ot I and Baldwini v. Missouri 2  the court renounced these
decisions 3  and in 1932, in First National Bank v. Maine4
it made emphatically clear its position that multi-state
taxation of intangibles was not permissible 4t all. There-
after interest centered upon speculation as to which one of
two or more competing states with plausible claims to tax
1 (1930) 280 U. S. 204.
2 (1930) 281 U. S. 586.
3 See Peppin, The Power of States to Tax Intangibles or
Their Transfer (1930) 18 Calif. L. Rev. 638, note 6.
4 (1932) 284 U. S. 312.
would win the court's approval of its claims. 5  That two
or more might tax seemed to be a dead issue but it'was
only dormant after the way of a sleeping volcano. There
remained of the 1930 court majority only a minority in
1937 and the time grew ripe to renounce the renunciation.
In that year there were still only portentous rumblings 6
and it was not until the following year that the second
renunciation was undertaken in Schuylkill Trust Co. v.
Commonwealth of.Pennsylvania, 7 upholding a state's ad
valorem taxation of shares of a domestic corporation held
by a non-resident while conceding that the same shares might
also be taxed in another state where the shareholder resided.
The case was concerned with property taxation, but vhatever
limitations the renunciation might have been oceptible
to on that account were forestalled in 1939 by Curry v.
McCanle.ss 8 and Graves v. Elliott, 9 upholding multi*-state
inheritance taxation of intangibles.
5 Interest was centered particularly in the question
whether the state of the owner's domicile would have to
give way to a state in which the intangibles had a
business situs.
-6 First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota (1937) 301 U. S,
234. See also Cohn v. Graves (1937) 300 U.S. 308.
7 .(1938) 302 U.. S. 506..
S(1939) 5.9 Sup. Ct. 900.
In the McCanless case intangibles 4reda
in trust by a'Tennessee settlor to an Alabama trixstee. The
trust instrument provided that the ncom4 of the trust should
be paid t6 the settlor for life and reserved to her the power
of which she availed herself to dispose of the trust-estate
by will. Suit was brought in Tennessee against*the tax
officials of both states under the Tennessee Declaratory
Judgments Act to determine the extent to which the trust
estate was taxable by each state, and it thus became possible
for the claims of both states to be presented before the -
United State Supreme Court in the same case.
When the Tennessee courts "considered that the primary
question f or determination was the situs ofK location to be
attributed to the intangibles of the trust estate at the
time of decedent's death" they acted in-obedience to.the
theery that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the multiple
taxation of intangibles and.therefore.compelled a determiah
ation which would prevent their taxation elsewhere than at
the situs determined upon. Since this was precisely the
theory upon which the Supreme Court acted in 1930 and 19320
the state courts had no -choice but to follow it, under phe
assumption that Supreme Court decisions are law uatil oVes
ruled. When -th~e Supreme Court in 1939 commented tha
Tennessee courts followed this theory *despite te im4.
bility in the circumstances of this aeof atr.uing
single location to that which has no physiC
aid which is associated in numerous intimate ways with both
States" it conveyed the impression that the Tennessee
courts were unaware of that improssibility. Actually the
quarrel of the Supreme Court majority.of 1939 is not with
the Tennessee courts, but with the Supreme Court majority
of 1930-1932. The later majority wished to overrule the
earlier decisions but not outright and so it repudiated
the direct descendants of those decisions in the Tennessee
courts,
The completeness of the break is dissimulated by an
engaging lack of frankness:
"The doctrine, of recent origin, that the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes the taxation of
any interest in the same intangible in more than
one state has received support to the limited
extent that it was adlied in Farmers Loan and
.rust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204; Baldwin v.
missouri, 281 U. 5. 586, First V;ational Bank v.
Maine, 284 U. S. 312. Still gore recently this
court has declined to give it completely logical
apDlication. 1 0 It has never beenoressed to the
extreme now urged upon us and we think that neither
reason nor authority requires its aqeptance in the
circumstances of the present case.
The court was more .thoroughgoing in its stand than these
words would intimate, for while it limited itself to a stout
10 The court refers in a footnote at this point to Lawrence
v. State Tax Com. (1932) 286 U. S. 276; Cohn v. Graves, supra
note 6; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia (1938) 305 U, S. 19;
Senior v. Braden (1935) 295 U. S. 422; Corry v. Baltimore
(1905) 196 U. S. 466; First Bank Stock Corporation v. Minne-
sota, supra note 6; Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Commonwealth of
Penn., supra note 7.
11 (1959) 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 903.
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declaration against inf lation of the doctrine it effedtiVely
collapsed it.
This is not the first time that the court has over-
ruled earlier decisions by indirection and dissimulated its
volte-face by covert language. The passing reference to
the recent origin of the doctrine served to belittle it"
and the grudging admission that it has received support
to a limited extent serves actually to suggest that in the
future even that limited application will be reduced to
the vanishing point. The same reason and authority which
operate against the doctrine in the present case would
operate against the doctrine in the cases cited in the
quotation. The Tennessee courts erred not in pressing the
doctrine to the extreme but in invoking it at a time when
the. Supreme Court no longer approved of it, for the opinion
of the four dissenting justices makes it evident that the
court majority that laid down the doctrine would certainly
have held it applicable to this case.
Inreopening the way to multi-state inheritance as
well as multi-state ad valorem taxation of intangibles the
court faced thenecessity of explaining Why intangibles
enjoyed a less favorable position than tangibles. Multi-
state-tatation of intangibles is as harsh &s ffulti-state
taxation of tangibles; it penalizes interstate as against
local investments in the same w'ay~as it would in the case
of tangibles and it differs only in degree in troubling
the waters of interstate relations. 1 2  The court finds a
distinction, not because the reasons for multi-state taxa-
tion of intangibles could not also be applied to tangibles
but because the reasons against multi-state taxation of
tangibles are inapplicable to intangibles. Long engrained
doctrine in the common law and other legal systems localizes
the rights in tangibles for the purposes of jurisdiction of
courts, conflict of laws, and taxation in the state where the
tangible itsel is located. That state alone can insure the
full benefit and protection of those rights and effectively
reach the property in the enforcement ot the tax. Here then,
the court declares, is an exclusive dominion offering a basis
for an exclusive taxing jurisdiction, a situtation without
parallel in'the taxation of intangiblos which have no physical
location.
The touchstone of the distinction between the taxa-
tion of tangibles and intangibles is physical location; its
presence effectiv61y prevents multi-state taxation and its
absence opens the way to it. But cases arise, as in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky,13 where the touchstone
12 See Burnet v. Brooks (1933) 288 U. -. 378 and Estate of
McCreery (1934) 220 Cal. 26, distinguishing between the power
of Congress and the power of the states to tax intangibles.
The Court repudiates this distinctionV in the McCaniless case:
alf the tdue process clause' of the Fifth Amendment does not
require us to fix a si.ngle exclusive place of taxation of
intangibles for the benefit of their foreign owner, who is
entitledto its protection, Burnet .v.Brooks,.288 U. S. 378;
of. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. U. S., 282 U. S. 481, the
Fpurteenth can har'dly be thought to miake. us do so hero, for
thlh due process clause of each amondment is directed at the
Pro eion of the individual' and he'is entitle toisimnity
as ~ach against the state as against the national government."
~ (i~L~)-22 U. S. 630
fails to work, for a tangible which has no physeal 1oo tion
in any state is as devoid of physical location for purposee
of state taxation as any intangibles A new touchstone then
comes into play, the same one which operates in the taxation
of intangibles, namely, "control over the person at the place
of his domicile and his duty there, common to all citizens
to contribute to the support of government." 1 4 Physical
location then is not the sole criterion for determining the
taxation of tangibles and others will be found whenever they
are necessary to justify one state in levying a tax when all
other states are powerless to do so. The ease with which
one was found in Southern Pacific Company v. Kentucky to
justify a tax which found no morrings in the hallowed doctrine
of physical location indicates that the court will allow
nei.ther tangibles nor intangibles to escape taxation for lack
of a suitable doctrine to justify a tax. Kentucky afforded
no substantial protection to the rights taxed and could not
effectively lay hold of any interest in the property in order
to compel payment of the tax." The di m and substance of her
power was relative and depended not upon physical locat o
but upon what the other states. could do. .
The rule that tangibles are taxable in th4 ate
their physical location or at the owner's d.omicile intw
absence of physical location in any state preventsao
U.6
multi-state taxation on the one hand.but.,complete avoid-
ance of taxation on the other. Beneath its overgrowth-
of custom the rule is rooted not in inexorable logic but
in expediency. For the most part this expediency has pro-
duced equitable results equivalent to those the states
probably would have arrived at independently and it was
natural enough that the court in 1930 should seek comparable
protection against multi-state taxation for intangibles. It
began with the rule that taxation should be at the state of
the owner's domicile in the absence o.f better claims but did
not specify what the alternative claims might be or when they
were to take precedence. Conflicts inevitably arose, presaging
more in their wake, which threw upon the court the difficult
task of recognizing only one claim when more than one was
plausibly entitled to recognition. Cury v. IMcCanless and
Graves v. Elliott made it dramatically clear that. when the
court was faced with two convincing claims it could not select
one without inventing reasons against the other and thus
embarking upon limitations of state power which would either
arbitrarily constrict a normally flexible leGislative function
within the iron lady of constitutional doctrine or breed con-
fusion calling for constant restatement of those limitations.
The court pulled up short and abandoned its position against
multiple taxation of intangibles on the ground that it con-
stituted an unwarranted curtailment of the power of states
ttax persons whom they control and protect in those
relationships in which lie the origin of the. iht a*
stituting intangibles. Had-the court followed this reaseon-
ing to the end it would not have ccncerned itself with the
defense of its position Against multi-state-taxation of tan*-
gibles for the "control over the person at the place of his
domicile and his dUty there to contribute to the support of
government" is not diminished by the nature of the property
owned.
Physical location, upon which the court pegged its
position against multi-state taxation of tangibles, could not
be invoked against multi-state taxation of intangibles having
no physical location, and the court refused to conjure up a
fictitious physical location to force intangibles within the
rule governing tangibles. Intangibles, said the court, are
not related to physical .thinGs but represent relationships
between persons, and jurisdiction to tax them arises from.
that dominion over and protection afforded the personsihiah
alone can make the relationships effective. When-relation-
ships which are sources of actual or potential wealth are
created between persons- under the dominion atnd proteetion of
mnore than one state, more' than one state will have poe9
This was the situation in gug v. MOe a .
'th'e Tennessee decedent transferred the inth1 be t
Alabama trustee while reserving a general
ment equivalent to ownership of the ra<
S'.40-tj~
"two sets of legal relationships resulting in
distinct intangible rights, the one embodied in
the legal ownership by the Alabama trustee of the
intangibles, the other embodied in the equitable
right of the decedent to control the action of the
trustee with respect to the trust property and to
compel it to pay over to her the income during her
life and in her power to dispose of the property at
death."15
The power which she retained was a potential source of wealth
which was property in her hands and the court regarded her as
under the highest obligation to contribute from such wealth
to the support of the government of Tennessee whose protection
she enjoyed. When Tennessee imposed a tax upon the exercise
of that power which she alone controlled in that state, she
came directly within the rule of Bullen v. Wisconsin1 6 which
had been temporarily eclipsed by the series of cases from
1930 to 1932. At the same time the legal ownership of the
intangibles by the Alabama trustee, which under Safe Dosit &
Trust Co. v. Virginia1 7 afforded a basis for subjecting them
to a property tax in Alabama, served likewise as a basis for
a tax upon their transfer even when effected by the decedent's
testamentary act in another state. The court could not have
chosen between the equally good claims of Tennessee and
Alabama without discriminating against one state or the other,
and in the final analysis it was the decedent herself who
15 59 Sup. Ot. 900, 907.
16 (1916) 240 U. S. 631.
17 (1929) 280 U. S. 83.
r-11-
opened up the way. to multi'-state taxation by ereatmii gA
different set of legal interests in each'state*
The whole problem ot multi-state taxation of intan-
gibles takes on added significance when intangibles are held
in trust and the settlor retains sufficient control or interest
in them-to render them subject to death taxation. When, as
in Curry v. McCanless, the testatrix reserved the power to
dispose of the trust estate by will, or as in Graves v. Elliott,
the testatrix reserved a power of revocation, the intangibles
which they placed in trust became somewhere subject to death
taxes even though the location of the power to levy such taxes
had to be determined by the court. The characteristic
elusiveness of trust property in the field of taxationl8compels
a certain latitude in locating the power to tax-it and when
the court in these cases allowed that latitude it shut the
door to escape from taxation even though it opened the door
to multi-state taxation. Had the dissenting justices preo
vailed and limited the power to tax to the state of the
trustee's domicile the way would have been open for in"
tangibles held in trust to.avoid some measure of. taxation
whenever the tax by the state of the settlor's domicile
exceeded 80% of the federal estate tax imposed under. the
Revenue Act of 192619 for the settlor could then transfer h
18See Traynor, State Taxation of Trust Income (1937).
22 Iowa L. Rev. 268.
19 I. R. C. s ec tion 813; Regulationfs 80 Art. 9.
intflibles to.rustees in states which either iimpose rno
taxes-thereon or taxes at low rates. When ever..the. tax-by
the state of the settlor's domicile did not exceed that 80
no tax saving would have resulted from such a device for the
tax would have been paid to the federal government instead Of
to the state. So long as Only a few states imposed death
taxes higher than that 80% and so long as the federal govern-
ment-allowed the 80% credit no widespread avoidance would
have occurred but it would have been a menacing prospect in
view of the growing pressure upon both the federal government
and the states to find additional revenue.
When the court abandoned its struggle against multi-
state taxation of intangibles it returned that problem to
the states,:,where it appropriately belongs. It might in
time'have won on every front its battle against multi-state
taxation but only by choking with restrictions the vital
taxing power of the states and paving new ways foir tax avoid-
ance, .It.Yielded to the lesser evil, which can be.:eliminated
by the states themselves, to prevent greater*enes which might
not easily be undone in the wayward ourse fjudicial
recantations. The states themselves have already gone far
to solve the problem. Twenty-two of them now provide for
reeipreal exemption and ten for outfight exemption Prom-
d~at~t~e on-intangi-ble property of non-residents,20 an
~x~dirrey and self-interest will undoubtedly lead others
to similar action. In the case of trusts, Cury v. oanless
and Graves v. Elliott, by removing obstacles to multi-state
taxation, will paradoxically drive the states into preventing
it themselves. When settlors taxable upon their intangibles
at their domicile wish to select trustees in other states
they will naturally be magnetized to those states which offer
exemption. The eventual result will be that other states
will likewise forego their power to tax the intangibles of
non-residents in the realization that such a power would be
a futile one if there were no trust property to tax.
Given the practical considerations which deter states
from imposing taxes upon intanGibles transferred to domestic
trustees by non-resident settlors, the chances of tax avoid-
ance are multiplied in cases where the property becomes a
proper subject of death taxation by reason of the settlor's
reservation of the income for life. 2 1 Here thaere is no
reservation of a general power of appointment as in Curry
v. McCanless or of a power of revocation as in Graves v.
Elliott, upon which might be posited the right of the state
21 In such cases the property has been generally held to be
part of the decedent's estate for purposes of death taxation
because its transfer in trust so closely approximates a testa-
mentary disposition by virtue of taking effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after the settlor's death. Helvering v.
Bullard (1938) 58 Sup. Ct. 565, Cf. Hasset v. .Welch (1938) 58
Sup. Ct. 559; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett (1933) 287 U. 8.
509; Matter of Brandreth (1902) 169 N. Y. 437, 62 N. E.
563; Matter of Green (1897) 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292; In
re Estate of Resing (1932) 186 Minri. 56, 242 N. W. 459; (1926)
75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 168 (1929) 38 Yale L. .J. 657, (1927) 49
A. L. fl. 874, 878; (19305 67 A. L. R1. 1247.
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of the settlor's domicile to tax. The virtual ownership
of trust property represented by such powers is very
different ffrom a life interest therein. Tn the first two
instances the settlor retained control over the disposition
off: the whole property until the day he died. In the last
instance he renounced control over all of the property except
his life interest and one must determine whether the retention
of that interest alone can serve as a basis for a death tax
on the entire trust corpus by the state, of the settlor's
domicile. Unless it can serVe as a basis there, the way is
open to tax avoidance, e iven the impracticability of a tax
by the state of the trustoo's domicile. 2 It is therefore
pertinent-to turn to the general reasons which justify a
death tax to determine whether they govern the imposition
of such a tax by the state of the settlor's domicile. There
are-two justifications in Helverin v. Bullard for the
application of the federal estate tax to transfers of the kind
in question. One is that the tax in this instance is tantar-
mount to a gift tax and the application of a ligher rate
bracket resulting from the inclusion of the gift in the
dAcedent'e gross estate falls within the power of Conr;ress
to classify gifts for the purposes of taxation and to apply
difterent rates to sifts with and without reservations of
The onl~y restraint on tax avoidance here, as in the
titWpation discussed above would be the 80% credit-allowed
:*&the eteral estate tax.
life interests. The other justification is "the au-h& t
of Congress to treat as testamentary transfers with reser*
vation of a power or an interest in the donor,"12 4 for the
purposes of preventing tax avoidance. The reasons which
make the federal tax consistent with the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment likewise make a tax by the state
consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when the settlor and the trustee are both domiciled
in the same state and the transfer takes place entirely within
its borders. The question arises whether the same certainty
attaches to a tax by .the state of the settlor's domicile
when settlor and trustee are doniciled in different states
and the negotiations surrounding the transfer of the intangi-
bles are all carried on in the state of the trustee's dom-
icile. It is established in Curry v. McCanless that such a
state can tax a testamentary transfer by virtue of its con-
trol over the -settlor from whom the trustee's title is
derived, and of the settlor's obligation to contribute -to
a
the support of his state. Since it is also established
that a transfer of property in trust with a reservation of
a life interest can be treated as testamentary it would eeees
to follow that the state of 'the settlor's domicile at the
time of the transfer 'is empowered to' tax such tranater by~
virtue of its control over the settlor and o? th ttlt
24
303 U. S. 297, 299.
o16o
obligation to contribute to its support such a state, in
the language of Curr v. McCanless, "is not deprived, by
the taxpayer's activities elsewhere, of its constitutional
jurisdiction to tax.25
When the settlor moves to another state where he is
domiciled at his death, a new question arises as to whether
this state becomes empowered to impose a death tax with
respect to the intangibles. There would seem to be no
substantial basis for such a power for the new state is not
even distantly related to the 'trust corpus and its thread
of connection therewith lies entirely in the settlor's life
interest. That thread would hardly bridge the distahce
between its taxing jurisdiction and property which was never
owned within its borders and never transferred there. If
the tangibles are to be subjected to state death taxation
the choice of the taxing jurisdiction would seem to settle
upon the state of the settlor's domicile at the time of their
transfer. Even that state, however, must take measures to
make its tax effective in the event the settlor moves to
another state without leaving any property out of which the
tax could be collected. It could, anticipate that situation
by imposing a gift tax at the time of the transfer in trust,
to be duly credited against the subseqent dea~th tax*,2gnnd
25 59 Sup. Ot. 900, 906. 
.
28See I. R. C. section 936; Reg. 80 Art..9 for federal pro-
vision for gift tax credit against federal estate tax.
exacting enough security to cover whatevr Want the
death tax might represent in exces8 of the gift ts.
Mr. Justice Reed reserved his conclusion with regard
to the court t s statement in Cur v.. McCa~nle that,
"taxation of a corporation by a state where it
does business, measured by the value of the
intangibles used in its business there, does not
preclude the state of incorporation from imposing
a tax measured by all its intanibles.' 2 7
It was not surprising, therefore, that only four members Of
the court in Newark Fire Insurance Qg. v. State Boad of
28Apeals2 voted to uphold, upon the authority of _reap0 9
Wheat Co. v. Count of Grand Forks, a New Jersey personal
property tax upon the intangibles of-a"domesti ocorporation
with executive offices in New York City, regardless of the
taxing jurisdiction of other states. The other four left
open the question whether the intangibles could be taxed in
two states, and upheld the tax on the ground that the pre-
sumption of taxability in the state of domicile Wa not over-
come by "the mere fact that the general aff i'e of-a foreign
corporation are conducted by general officers in New lork
without further evidence of the source. and charaeter Of the
intangibles.113
27 9 Sup. Ct. 900, 906.
2(1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 918,
29 (1920) 253 U. S. 325. . . 4~
59 Sup. Ot4 918, 922.
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In Giarant 'T ust COmpany v' Commonwealth of Vir1inia
the courthelf'or the first time that the Fourteenth Amends-
ment 'dd not 'Pohibit the state of residence of the benefici-
ary of' a discretionary trust from taxing the net income
eceived fr.om a trust, even though the state where the trust
was administered and the trustee domiciled had taxed the
entire net income from the trust to the trustee. While
the-opinion places the question of multi-state taxation of
income on the threshhold of settlement32 it is cautious
enough to enable the court to distinguish the case on the
ground that the income was taxed to successive owners and
not to the same owner and is therefore analogous to a case
where one state taxes a corporation's income and another
taxes a resident's dividend declared therefrom. There is
little likelihood., however, that the court will make such
a distinction3 and every indication from its present
receptivity to multi-state taxation that it would uphold
such taxation of income even to the same owner.
Prior to 1935, Wisconsin exempted dividends from the
income tax, either in whole or in part, but in 1935 it placed
a tax on dividends received in 1933 and 1934 which had not
1M(1938) 59 Sup. Ct. 1.
-. it thus brings within sight of realization the implications
'of Cohnv. Graves (1937) 300 U. S. 308, Whitney v. G-raves (1937)
2Q9 TI $ 66, Lawrence v. State Tax Commission (1932) 286 U. S.
276 and Shaffer v. Carter (1920) 252 U. S. 37.
See Stone v. White (1937) 301 U. S. 532, 537, and Senior
y~Dadn a(19s6) 295 U. S. 422.
been subject to the income tax in those years.. The.tax
was a special one in which the regular deductions were not
applicable. A taxpayer.contested the application of the tax
to his 1933 dividiends on the ground that it denied him equal
protection of the laws by taxing his dividends more heavily
than the income tax taxed other incore,.34and by taxing his
dividends retroactively, which it was argued was also a
35
violation of due process.,. The court in Welch v. FEenrg denied
the validity of each of. these contentions.
The court reasoned that not only were dividends.
manifestly different from other forms of. income but classifi-
cation was additional.ly justified. by the state's having
previously either exempted them or. taxed; them at a lower
rate than that applicable to other income. This former ad-
vantage may distinguish .Telch v. Henry from other instances
of special treatment of dividends,. and.prevent its being con-
clusive authority on the validity of the numerous special state
taxes on dividends.36
Because the ordinary deductions allowed in computing net
income were not allowred in computing the special dividend tax,
the-burden on dividends was greater0
(1938) 59 Sup. Ct. 121. M r. Justice Poberts, Mr. Justice
HcReynoilds and .r. Justice 3utler dissented.
56In gieneral the state courts have upheld these taxes. See
Shields -v. V ~.Imms~ .99) -159 Tenn., 349, 19 S5. W. (2i) 261. .
See also }CKJ sts v. Treas2u2er (21921 237 Mass. 493, 130 N. E.
60, affnxu i' on aothe oint: 360 U. 3.'l2. Colgate v. Harvey
(1935) 399 U . u0'4, is not conclusive for there the. taxpayer
was not suojudted to a greater t~axc burden because he received
dividends.
-20.-
"TO,
The majority disposed of the argument that the
retroactivity of the tax constituted a denial of equal
protection of the laws by reference to federal retroactive
tax laws. While the court failed to observe that the equal
protection clause is not a limitation upon Congress but only
upon the states, it went on to .point out that the clause did
not deny the power of state legislatures to equalize previous
inequities. The retroactive nature of the tax was also held
unobjectionable with regard to the due process clause. The
majority opinion called attention to the numerous cases up-
holding the retroactive application of the federal income tax,
including Cooper v. U. S. which probably presented a more
doubtful issue than that involved here. It pointed out that
previous notice of the tax, required in the gift tax cases,
is not a prerequisite to validity where the tax is not one
on a voluntary act. The majority makes it clear that their
decision approves retroactivity only to the preceding
59legislative session.
37 (1930)280 U. S. 409. The Revenue Act of 1921 which
became effective November 23, 1921, was held validly to ascribe
the donor's basis to gift property acquired and sold by the
donee before that date. M r. Justice McReynolds, who with Mr.
Justice Roberts dissented in the instant case, wrote the opinion
for a unanimous court and held that a retroactive income tax
could be imposed on the value of gifts to prevent future tax
avo idanc e.
38 Nichols v. .Coolidge (1927) 274 U. S. 531, Untermeyer v.
Anderson (1928) 276 U. S. 440, and Coolidge v. Long (1951)
282 U. S. 582.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the principal case
did not mean that a tax on rentals passed in 1955 and retro-
active to 1919 was valid. -Such retroactivity was held invalid
in N. Y. ex rel. Beck v. Graves, decided May 25, 1939, 6 Law
Week 1566.
COMI6ERCE CLAUSE
The decisions of the 1938 term with regard to inter-
state commerce continue the recent trend away from the
restrictive effect of the commerce clause upon the state's
40power to tax.4 Nevertheless taxes on interstate commerce
still meet with disapproval when they are not properly
apportioned.. On that ground the court in Gwin, White and
Prince v. Henneford 4 1 invalidated the application of the
Washington "business activities" tax to the gross income of
a domestic corporation. The corporation, with headquarters
in Washington, was engaged in a general marketing business
selling products of both Washington and Oregon fruit growers
in other states and foreign countries and receiving a fixed
commission for each box sold. The corporation maintained at
numerous points outside the state representatives who negotid-
ated sales, made deliveries and collected payments which they
remitted to the corporation in Washington. It was stipulated
that Washington made no claim to tax the Qregon business and
the court-was,. therefore, concerned with the validity of the
tax only as it was measured by the receipts of shipments
from Washington.
See Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commnerce (1939)
52 Harv. L. Rev. 617; Jbhnson, Multi-State Taxation of Inter-
stat~e Sales (1939) 27 Calif. L. Rev. 549.
41 (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 325.
In holding the tax invalid under the commerce clause
the court was careful to specify that the tax was not
apportioned to activities within the state. Thus, the
" added reason" advanced by the court the previous year
for sustaining the tax in the Western Live Stock case 4 2
became the basis of its decision against the Washington
tax. It pointed out that had this tax been valid other
states to which the commerce extended might have levied
a similar tax and interstate commerce would thus have
become subject to cumulative burdens.
Ficklin v. Shelb County Taxin District,, relied
upon by the Washington Supreme Court,44 was distinguished
by the United States Supreme Court in such a way as to lend
forceful support to the apportionment theory. Despite some
factual similarity the activities of the firm in the Ficklin
case were all conducted within the taxing state whereas in
the Gwin case they were carried on within and withoiut the
taxing state, ard the tax upheld in the Ficklin case was
imposed by the buyer's state, while the tax invalidated in
the Gwin case was imposed by the seller's state. The com-
missions by which the tax was measured in the Ficklin case
are comparable to the commissions deducted by the out-of-
state agents in the Gwin case rather than the receipts less
42Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Re-venue (1938) 303 U. S.
250.
(1892) 145 U. S. 1.
44 (1938) 193 Wash. 451, 75?'. (2d) 1017.
t2v.
commissions by which the Washington tax was measured. While
a separable local business may also have existed in the Gwin
case, as it did in the Ficklin case, taxability did hot turn
upon the existence of that business but upon the apportion#
ment of the tax. The implication in the Gwin case is that
the first condition would not have been required if the
second had been present and in that respect it represents
an advance over the Ficklin case. The court went out of its
,:.ay to strengthen the theory of apportionment for it could
have taken the traditional approach by declaring the tax
invalid under the commerce clause on the .basis of Heyman v.
45 46Hayes and Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania.
In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Black observed
that the theory of apportionment was based upon a fear of
multiple taxation which in this case he regairded as ground-
less. Earlier decisions of the court held that the activities
of the corporation's representatives in other states could
not be taxed therein, and as it had not actually been so
taxed in this case, the multiple taxation which the court
purported to avoid did not in .fact exist. The decision,
therefore, resulted in an actual discrimination against
intrastate commerce. In Mr. Justice Black's view multiple
taxation is a subject of legislative rather than judicial
inquiry, but if the theory of apportionment is to be followed
45 (1915) 256 U. S. 178.
46 (1917) 245 U. S. 29g.
24"
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by the court, it requires logical extension so that what-
ever cannot be apportioned to one state may be apportioned
to another.
The general applibation of a use tax was upheld in
Hehneford, V. Silas Mason Company47 but it remained undeoo
termined whether the tax could be applied to property pur-
chased for use-in interstate commerce and whether the state
in that event could require sellers maintaining plR.ces of
business within- its borders to act as collection agents in
its behalf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallaher 4 8 and Pacific
elehone and .erah Co. v. Gallagher49 upheld the.
application of the California Use Tax, 5 0 .to property purchased
outside the state and brought within its borders for subseauent
47 (19.37) 300 U. S 577.
So well established has the validity of the use tax become
that the court dismissed for want of-a substantial federal
question in Bacon and Sons v. Martin (1938) 59 Sup. Ct. 82,
an appeal from a judgment of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
sustaining such a.tax. The plaintiff contended that the
Kentaicky tax imposed on.nthe receipt of cosmetics in the State
by a Kentucky retailer" iaa a tax on the "act of receiving"
articles purchaeed from manufacturers and dealers in other
statet and transported to plaintiff at its place of business
in Kentucky, and hence constituted a direct burden on inter-
atate commerce. The state court had held that the word
receipt* was used in the statute in,the sense of use follow-
thg the consummation of the sale, and construed the tax as
ispoped not on the act of receiving but on the sale-and use
of' the cosmetics by the retailer foll6wing receipt, and this
Ponstraution was binding upon the Supreme Court. it may be
nioted in passing that the Court did not make the validity of,
~theJ~ tax contingent upon the fact that a tax had not been paid
at&qan other state with respect to the sale of the cosmetics,
* )(940)59 Sup. Ct. 389.
(1939) 59 Sup. Ot. 396.
Cal ~. thta 1935, oh. 361, p. 1297.
use in the courose of mixed intrastate and interstate com-..
merce. 5 1 Both the transaction which brought the goods into
52the state and the use to which the goods were put after
introduction 53were protected from state taxation by the
icommerce clause,54 and the question turndd upon whether
there was a taxable event between interstate transportation
and interstate use subject to the use tax. Much of the
property was shipped directly to the place of use and
installed as soon thereafter as possible, most of it was
51
In the Southern Pacific case the court pointed out that
"The tax is not sought from-mpersonal property used in trans-
actions entirely disassociated from any agency connected with
interstate transportation. . . . but from tangible personalty
purchased out of the state for immediate or subsequent
installation in an interstate railway facility." 59 Sup. OCt.
391. The Telephone Case involved.two classes of-property (1)
special order equipment immediately installed in buildings
devoted to mixed intra and interstAte business, and (2) stand-
by supplies stored "at points on the systemsuitable for
prompt distribution."
52 The opinion in the Southern Pacific Case refers to the
transactions as "extrastate purchases" 59 Sup. Ct. 389, 391.
In the Telephone case the opinion states that "appellant pur
cnases outside California. . . materials and suppli-es which
are shipped to it in interstate commerce.' 59 Sup. Ct. 396.
53 In the Southern Pacific case office equipment was placed
in offices used to supervise interstate activities, materials
were used to repair, replace and improve interstate facilities.
In the Telephone case the property in question was used in
the "necessary operation, maintenance and repair of" the mixed
interstate and intrastate system.
54The opinion in the Southern Pacific case points out that
the state did not dispute the premise that a state excise
"directly upon the privilege of, using instrumentalities in
carrying on interstate transportation is a direct and uztcon-~
stitutional burden on commerce.'
4
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adapted only to railroad pr telephone uses,. and all of it
was stored,.if .at all, only for brief periods. Nevertheless
the court held (Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice MoReynolds
dissenting) that there intervened between the conclusion of
the interstate transit and the beginning of the interstate
use a retention and installation of the goods which con-
stituted a taxable event. "The interstate movement was
complete," said the court. "The interstate consumption had
not begun." 5 5 In isolating a taxable event to support the
constitutionality of the tax, the. court held the cases
56
-overned by Nashville C. & St. L. e-. Co. v. Wallace,. and
distinguished Helson v. Kentucky57 which held invalid a
Kentucky tax on the use of fuel, supplied at Ohio, in the
oPeration of an interstate ferryboat.
However weakened the latter decision has been by
subsequent decisions upholding taxes on storage, or with-
drawal from storage58 and by the decisions in the instant
casps that property purchased for use in interstate commerce
is not used in that commerce while held or ihstalled for use,
it would still preclude the taxation of such property as
railroad rolling stock. which was used in interstate commerce
59 Sup. Ct. 389, 393.
56 (1933) 288 U. S. 249. This case upheld a tax on the
storage or withdrawal frbm storage of fuel used as a source
of motive power in interstate railroad operation.
S(1929) 279 U. 5. 245.
58Nashville Chattanooga etc. By. v. Wallace (1933) 288 U. S.
249; Edelman vi Boeing.Air:Transpor~t Inc~. (1933) 289 U. S. 249.
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prior to its first entry into the state and *as thereafter
used in the state only in interstate commerce. Only by a
fine distinction, therofore, does the court uphold the
application of a use tax to railroad supplies while they
are stored before use, or to telephone switchboards while
they are installed, since the storage and the installation
are done in furtherance of interstate comm erce by owners
who are engaged in interstate commerce. The retention or
installation of necessity precedes actual use or consumption
in the interstate railroad. or telephone systems. It is not
less essential to -thenoperation .of the systems than the actual
use itself, and a tax imposecd at the moment of storage or
installation is not less a burden than a tax imposed at the
moment of actual use.
The isolation from interstate commerce of a taxable
event takes on significance in connection with the "cumulative
burdens doctrine of the Western Live Stock case. 5 9 In
Southern Pacific Co. v. Lallagher the court stated:
"Where a similar levy by another state may be
imposed with consequent multiplicity of exaction
on commerce for the same taxable event, local tax
of a privilege, measured by total gross receipts
from interstate transactions, is considered identical
with an exaction on the commerce itself.o8 0
The "cumulative burdens" rule would thus seem to be limited
to cases where one taxable event is .exposed to the taxing
power of more than one state and inapplicable to a taxable
Supra note 42. --- -
60 59 Sup. C t. 389, 392. EmphasiS a~dded. -
eve~nt isolated from interstate commerce removed from the
taxing power of more than one state.W61 hile the California
Use Tax Act exempts property, the gross receipts from the
sale of which are subject to the state sales tax, it has
no provision for' a credit for sales tax paid to some other
state, but as there was no evidence of the payment of any
such tax the court held there was no discrimination against
interstate commerce from Ila second exaction for use after
a foreign tax on sale.1162 Since the essence of the cumulative
burdens doctrine is the exposure to the risk of discriminatory
multiple tax burdens rather than their actual imposition
it is unlikely that the use tax will be held invalid under
that doctrine as there was an evident risk here of exposure
to a sales tax in another state. The court's recosnition
of a particular taxable event localized in the state as an
appropriate subject for the use tax, however, would seem
to indicate that a use tax will not be invalidated by the
risk of sales taxes vihich cannot reach the same taxable
event.
61 This limitation is implicit in the court's decision last
term in Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co. (1938)
303 U. S. 604.
62 '7hile the court in Henneford v. Silas Lason Co. (1957)
300 U. S. 577, emphasized the degree of equality made possible
by the credit provision, it was careful to point out that it
did not intend to imply that the credit provision was necessary
.to -the constitutionality of the tax.
6See note 61 supra..
Apart from theareqPal considerations a requirement
that a state imposing a use tax give credit for taxes paid
to other states would be beset by-.practical difficulties.
it would be extromely difficult for one state to check
when and where such taxes had been paid in other states.
In some cases the credit might be claimed even before the
tax was paid to the seller state because of different report-
ing periods in the states. Even if it were feasible for
states to make investigations for one another such factors
as the discontinuance of the seller's business or the
destruction of his records would make it impracticable to
verify claims for credit. The sales tax paid at the state
of origin may be subject to refund, which might be made
long after the credit has been allowed at the state of
destination. Finally, there would be uncertainty as to
vhether the credit requirement would apply not merely to
sales taxes but to manufacturers' excise and other taxes
which can be passed on to the consumer.
With their constitutionality established, *use taxes
needed only the decision in Felt & Tarrant I* . Co._v.
Gallagher 6 4 to insure their practicability. The court
there held constitutional the provision of the California
Use Tax Act requiring the collection of the tax from pur-
chasers, for subsequent remittance to the state, by sellers
maintaining places of business within the state. The seller
94 (1939) 5P Sup. Ct. 3576.
-.30-.
in this± case was an Illinois corporation maintaining offices
In"California with two general agents who solicited orders
in California subject to approval at the home office. It
did no intrastate business in Calif ornia and contended that
the provisions requiring it to collect the tax on the use
of comptometers which it sold in interstate commerce to
users in this state, was a burden on interstate commerce
sad a denial of due process.
In upholding a method by which the states may avoid
the effect of decisidna invalidating taxds on sellers in
interstate corftmerce, the court relied principally upon the
authority of Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson.65 In that case,
upholding the application of coll6ction provision in an
Iowa fuel tax law with respect to a sale in interstate
commerce, the State clearly had Jurisdiction over the
collecting agent inasmuch as its business in Iowa included
both local ahd interstate sales, The business-of the Felt
and Tarrant Co. in California, however, consisted exclusively
of interstate commerce, all its activity in 14ae state being
in furtherance of the sale of comptometers which were shipped
pursuant to contracts of sale with purchasers in California
from a point outside the state ;o the selleras agents in
the state for delivery to the purchasers.
In so far as the commerce clause is involved, the
(184)} 292 U. 8S 86 -
decision is adequately supported by the t00
thq obligation imposed upon the sellers oo le t t'e tax
with respect to its interstate sales of property wasopre.isO34
the same in each case, regardless of the fact that toh Felt
and Tarrant Company was engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce while the Monamotor Oil Company was not. The court
referred to the due process issue only to note that it agree4
with the view of the trial court that this issue, as well as
the one based on the commerce clause, was foreclosed by
Bowman et al v. Continental Oil 00,66 Monamotor 0iv o z.
Johnson67 and Hennefordve.Silas Mason Co.68
Inasmuch as the Silas Mason case was limited to the
validity of a use .tax, and the Bowman and Monamotor cases
were limited to the validity of certain statutory requiremen
with respect to sales in interstate commerce by' sellers en
gaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, they do
seem entirely conglusive-on the due process issue Neverth
that issue was squarely presented.in the .Intant ca se, and tb
decision therein establishes that'the stafb had SuttaoeZt A,
jurisdiction over the sellers.toe re them'to0
67 Supra note 65. ' '
68 18upra note 47. ," ~ ~
vf
remit theU-se tax.*- 9
Since the Felt and Tarrant case arose through a
Lit 'c enjoin the state from enforcing the statutory
requirement that the company collect and remit the amount
of the tax, it leaves unsettled the question of the sanctions
which may be imposed for the failure of a seller to comply
with that requirement. The California Use Tax Act requires
the seller to pay to the state the amount of tax he was re-
quired to collect from his purchasers during the period
eovered by his return. The state can clearly impose a
penalty for the failure of a seller to comply with the
statutory duty upheld by the court and the reauirement that
the seller pay to the state the entire amount he was obligated
to collect appears to be a reasonable method for insuring
compliance withthat duty.
The case is in marked contrast to James v. United
Artists Co .70 holding that a moti6n picture distributor
which received payment ih New York for the use of its films
69 See International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky
.(1914) 234 U.. S..579, which upheld the jurisdiction of a
state with respect to the service of process upon the local
agent of a firm doing a wholly interstaie business in the
state. Se-e also .Natural *Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slatery (1937)
302U. S.. 300, which upheld the imposition of a duty of fur
nisliing .a State .Gommerce Commission with information' from
affiliated interests of public utilities, upon a foreign
corporation. engaged exclusively in interstate commerce,. and
*denied the contention that the duty involved a violation of
the eomimerce clause and the fourteenth amendment.
(1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 272.
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was not subject to a West Virginia tax on every person
engaging...within this state in the business of collecting
incomes from the use of real or personal. property... ."
The distributor was a foreign corporation having no office
or place of business in West Vir1iniao It periodically
sent a solicitor into that state to obtain contracts for the
showing of its pictures, and sent its films to West Virginia
exhibitors who returned them after use to points outside the
state. Payment by the exhibitors was made by holding the
United Artists share of each night's receipts in trust until
the picture's run was completed, and then remitting it to 0
the United Artists Corporation at points outside the state.
The court interpreted the statute as requiring the presence
of the distributor within the state and the actual collection
by it within the state of the payments from the .exhibitors.
The United Artists Corporation did not come within either
of these conditions.7 1
The importance of the case lies not in its holding,
which is merely statutory interpretation, but in its impli"
cations. The court pointed out that the statute did not
71.
A three judge districet court in holding the tax an u
constitutional burden on interstate commerce relded. upon
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange (1923) 263 U. 5. 291, which held
that the business of furnishing films through shipments~ in
interstate commerce was interstate business notwithstanding
" that in accordance with the contracts the films were dette
through a local exchange . . . through which they were
consigned and transported." The Binderup case, howeve, z.
volved a question of federal regulation which the court
recognized could not be overned by ckses involvin abate
taxation of interstate commerce.
Aawi. )"t
raise the issue of the right of a state to tax incorme.
derived from sources within it. In concludin6 its opinion
the court reiterated its view that there was "no legislative
purpose in cases like the present to tax cross recoipts
apart from the business or activity of collectin;. them."
The inference that a different conclusion might have been
-N r 72reached by the court had the tax ben on income, may
reaffirm the court's inference at its previous term that
taxable income is realized in the state where sales are
solicited and obtained 7This inference, while not incon-
74
sistent with the Supreme Court's own decisions, is incon-
sistent with at least two decisions reached by other courts.
In Commissioner v. East Coast Oil Co. 7 5it was hold
72
Had the tax been on net income it would have been valid,
notwithstanding the activities of the taxpayer were solely
in interstate commerce insofar as West Virginia was concerned,
if the income was in fact derived from West Virginia. U. S.
Glue Co. v. Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, Peck & Co. v. Lowe
(1918) 247 U. S. 165. Had the tax been on cross income it
would apparently have been equally valid under the same
circumstances. See Adams Mfg.. Co. v. Storen and Gwin, White
& Prince v. Henneford, opra.
In Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen the court invalidated the
Indiana gross income tax because it did not provide for
apportionment of income to the states in which the goods were
sold. Since the reasoning was that there might thus arise
multiple taxation of interstate butsiness the inferenceis that
the states wherein the goods were sold could also tax a portion
of the income..
74 Whiled Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector (1929) 279
Ut. 5. 306, is fr'equently cited as holding that income is not
derived from soliciting and making sales and is not taxable by
the state wherein goods are sold, neither the stipulation of
facts on which the case was tried nor the court's opinion
supports this view.
(C. C. A. 5, 1936) 85 F. 32,
that income from sales was produced in meSio, where title,
to the product passed, and not in th6 Urited States wLere
agents of the seller solicited and obtained the sales*76
Similarly, in Curles Clothin Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm ito
the Oklahoma Supreme Court overturned a state income tax on
a corporation soliciting and making sales in that state.
States are becoming increasingly concerned with the
problem of taxing-interstate vehicles which use their high*.
ways. Dixie Ohio Epress 00o votate Ieveurue Commission78
placed in issue the constitutionality of the tax imposed by
the.Georgia Maintenance Tax Act on trucks, tractors and traile
ers. The tax was graduated on trucks and tractors acording to
capacity and on trailers 'according to weight. The rate
* applicable to vehicles hauling for hire was greater than the
rate applicable to other vehicles andt the proceeds from the
tax were allocated exclusively to rural post roads. The
taxpayer was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce
ard used about 100 vehicles on the highwaYs of the state,
but did wt use the rural.post roads to which the proceeds
of the tax were allocated. The tax, amunting to about
76 Seep however, Tootal Broadhurst Lee Co. V. Comissione
(19299 Co C, A. 2) 30 F. (2d) 239, cert, den, 49 S. 0t 410,
Billwiller's Estate v. Commrissioner (1929, C. C. A.2)1 be
(2d) 286 and Birkin (1926) B B.T.A. 402.
77(193?) 6 8 P. (ZdA) .834. .
78 (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 435.
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$6,000, was upheld against contentions that it was repugnant
to the commerce and equal protection clauses of the federal
Constitution.
The court held that the tax was exacted as compensation
for the use of the roads of the. state and that it was imma-
terial th t the state used "part or all of the proceeds of
the tax for purposes other than the construction, improvement
or maintenance of its highways." The decision recognizes
that even where it appears that the tax is compensation for
highway use, the taxpayer may question it whenever its amount
appears unreasonable. In this cage, however, the taxpayer
failed to prove such a contention. The court denied the
contention that the Act violated the equal protection clause
by imposing higher taxes on vehicles hauling for hire on
the ground that such vehicle presumably used the roads to a
larger extent than other vehicles. The case indicates that
the reasonable compensation to a state for the use of its
highways-may be :measured by their value to the user rather
than by expenditures made by the state in building, main-
taining and policing the highways.
In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., however, upholding
80the constitutionality of the California Caravan Act of 1937,
(1939) 59 Sup. Ot. 744.
80nacted as a substitute f or the act held unconstitutional
aglIn~ es v. Morf (1957) 300 U. S. 290, because the fees which
it imposed were excessive.
the court discussed the reasonableness of the fees in terms
of compensation to the state to meet the costs incurred by
it as a result of the caravan traffic. ie act before the
court in the Clark case defines caravaning as theu transporl-
tation of arty vehicle .... operated on its own wheels, or
in tow of a notor vehicle for the purpose of selling or
offering the same for sale within.or without this State,"
and exacts two license fees of $7.50 each for a six months1
permit for caravaning a vehicle on the highways of the state*
While the anaial graduated tax in Dixie Ohio Express Co. was
exacted as compensation for the use of state highways, the
California Act provi'des for the exaction of one fee to
reimburse the state for expenses incurred in administering
police regulations incident to the Act axi of. another fee
in return for the use of the state's highways. It provides
for two zones withinthe state and exempts intrazone mve-
ments from its provisions.
The taxpayer was engaged in caravaning cars interstate
for the purpose of sale in California and contended that
this activity could nOt be subjected to 'the Act without
violating the commerce, due.process and equal protection
clauses of the Corstitutione The court, citing the ____
Exrs Co. case anng others, declared that the comerce cb
does not prevent states from imposing reasonable fees for
use of highways .or from classifying vehicles according to
use of its .highways. There was evideron in this case ti&
the state's expenses resulting frorto estate ca
exceeded the fees collected. As for the due process and
equal protection issues, the court, relying upon Morf v.
81Bingaan, held that it was reasonable to classify separately
vehicles coupled together and moved under the control of
casual employees and to impose fees both for. use of the
highways and expense of policing. The exemption of intra-
zone caravaning was likewise held reasonable since there
was evidence that such caravaning caused fewer traffic
problems and resulted in less wear and tear on the high-
ways than the caravans driven to California from other
states. The court also refused to consider whether there
was an invalid discrimination as between cars driven into
the state singly for sale, and those driven in singly for
other purposes or those driven singly to market intrazone,
for the appellee did not transport any cars singly or in
intrazone movements, but moved all of its cars interstate in
caravans of nineteen to twenty-five cars, and was, therefore,
not in the class against which it alleged a discrinination
existed.
A recent.attempt by Florida tq protect its cement
industry from foreign competition was thwarted by the court
in Hale v. Bimco Tradi.ng Co.82 The Florida statute stated
that approximately 30%4 of all cement sold and used in the
(1936) 298 U. S. 40?.............
(1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 526.
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state was imported from foreign countries, that much of
this cement was of inferior qiality, and that its use "not
only jeopardizes public safety but amounts to unfair Oompeti-
tion being forced on this great industry in Florida*" It
authorized the State Roads Department to fix a minimum
standard for all cement offered for sale, sold or used
within the state and required an inspection and the payment
of an inspection fee of fifteen cents per hundred weight
for all cement brought into Florida from any foreign country.
The court reasoned that an inspection of domestic
cement would be as essential to "public safety" as that of
foreign cement, which was discriminated against by an
inspection fee amounting to sixty times the actual cost of
inspection. The statutory reference to protection from
unfair competition was regarded by the court as "a candid
admission that the very purpose of the statute is to keep
out foreign goods." The statute was, therefore, clearly
invalid under the Commerce Clause and its demise was hastened
by the bald candor of its language.
Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co. v. Hawaii 8 3 upheld
the application of a tax measured by gross income, imposed
under the Utilities Act of 1913 of the Territory.0f Hawaii,
to a common carrier of freight and passengers by water
between different points in the Territory. A substant1a1
83
(1938) 59 Sup. Ct. 202..
part of its gross income was derived from trarsporting
freight destined for trare-shipment to foreign or main-
land points. After detercining that it was mt the intent
of Congress that its Shipping Act of 191684 wholly supersede
the Territorial Act with regard to carriers like the petition-
er, the court held that even if it were assumed that the peo
titioner were engaged in interstate and foreign commerce,
Cong ress in the Act of 1916 had subjected petitioner to the
Territorial law under which the tax was levied. Congress
exercised its power to regulate conmerce in this instance
by.enabling the Territory to impose the tax. The court
held that, apart from its power under the commerce clause,
Congress could subject the petitioner to the tax by virtue .
of its plenary authority over Territories of the United States.
GOVERIZENTAL I.D1JNITY
The court has advanced far beyond Helverim v. Gerharat85
in its inroads against the long-standing governmental immunity
from taxation in three cases upholdirg the, taxation of govern".
mental salaries. New.York ex rel Graves v. O'Keefe 8 6 upheld
a .Pnrodiscriminatory income tax by New York on the salary of
one of its residents exployed by the Home Owners Loan corpo-
ration on the ground that it was a tax neither on the national
government nor on the property or ircome of the Home Owners
84 39 Stat. 728, 46 U. S. C. A. sec. 801..
85 (1938) 304 U..S. 406.
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Loan Corporation but on the employee'e income which became
isolated from its government source upon.reoeipt As conpen-
87sation. 8 The court determined that whateypr indirectburden
the tax imposed upon the federal Government did not -unduly
88interfere with its functions. Collector v. Day and New
89York ex rel Rorers v. Graves were expressly overruled
uso far as they recoGnize an implied constitutional irmiunity
from income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees
of national or a state governoont or their instrumentalities,'
In Van Cott v. State Tax Commission of Utah9 0 the
court held that the salary of an attorney for the Reoonstruem
tion Finance Corporation and the Regional Agricultural Credit
Corporation was not immune from a non-discriminatory state
income tax imposed by Utah.
0IMalleV v. Woodrough 91 upheld a tax under section 22(a
of the Revenue Act of 1932 on the salary of a federal judge
appointed. -after June 6,:1932. in holding that the payment,
in conon with other citizens, of a non-discriminatory inGo
87' "The theory which once won a qualified approval, that a
tax -on income is legally or economically a tax on its sourc
is no longer tenable. . ." 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 598. Contrast
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U3. S. 429.
(1870) 11 Wall. 113.
*89 (1936) 299 U. S. 401.
(1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 605.
1 ( 9k9) 59. Sup. 'C6t. 38
- Ps
tax did not constitute a diminution of compensation which
might threaten the independence of the judiciary, the court
has cleared the way for the eventual overruling of Evans v.
92Gore.
The reciprocal taxation by the federal and state
governments of the salaries of all government employees
now has a statutory basis in the Public Salary Tax Act of
193993 which, apart from the remedial provisions designed
to avert the retroactive application of such taxation, is
essentially a codification of the Gerhardt, O'Keefe and
Woodrouh cases. Title I subjects the salaries of all public
officers and employees, including Federal constitutional
judges inducted into office on or before June 6, 1932, to
the Federal income tax and consents to the non-discriminatory
taxation by the states of the salaries of all Federal officers
and employees received after December 31. 1938. Title II
relieves all state and municipal officers and employees from
retroactive Federal taxation on salaries received before
January 1, 1939, provided similar treatment.is accorded
Federal officers and employees by the states.
The doctrine that a net income tax is not a tax upon
its source may easily become the premise for a future denial
of tax immunity to interest derived from government securities
92 (1920) 255 U. S. 245.
93Pub. L. No. 52, -76th Cong. 1st Sess. (April 13, 1939.) See
Shaw, Tgie Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 (1950) 27 Calif L. Rev.
705.
if It appears that taxation will not indrease interest
rates sufficiently to interfere with the borrowing power
of the federal or state governmente,94
FEDERAL INCOME T
For nearly twenty years the Treasury Department has
followed the theory that a lessor realizes taxable income
whenever a lessee completes improvements which will have
value at the expiration of the lease and will revert with
the fee,95 because such improvements presumably increase
94 Estimates of the increase in the interest rate for stat
and municipal securities vary from 1/4 to 3/5 of 1%. See
Lutz, The Fiscal and Economic Aspects of the Taxation of
Public Securities, a report for the Comptroller of the State
of New York, incorporated in Hearings before. the Special Co r
mittee on Taxation of Government Securities and Salaries pur
suant to S. Res. 303, (75th Cong.), 76th Cong., 1st Ses.
(1939) 91-186, p. 12. Hillhouse, Inter-governmental Tax
Exemption, Municipal Year Book (1939), p. 375. Wenchell,
Federal State Reciprocal Taxation of Income from Public
Securities (1939) 17 Taxes, The Tax Magazine 507; Studene'ki,
Federal Taxation of State and Municipal Bonds (1939) 17 a
Ma;. 5; Tobin, The Constitutional Immunity of StateandL
Municipal Securities (1939) Address del~vered before the 1iv
Tax Clinic of the Committee on Federal Taxation, -San Vran
July 11, 1939; Foley, Twenty-Five Years of Tax Exemption
Privileggs (1939) Fordham Alumni Magazine 30. These authe
ties also disagree whether state and municipal governments
will ain. more from the.-taxation of interest on federal
securities than they will pay out in increased interest.
on their own securities..
The revenue'laws bave never specifically desi nated
revertible improvements erected by a lessee as i160ri 4 M
lessor, but in the Revenue Acts since 1913 deniZ$t
gross income have been attended by omaibus elauseq
"income derived from any source whatever" ad kad
include anyincome within the meaning~ of ~$een1
ment. I. R. C. section 22(n) defines gc ~~ea
ing ttgains, profits, and income deriv~ r W .ien
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%he. on rent value of the fee which the lessor has power to
.qell.
95 (cont)
or gains or profits and income derived from any source what-
ever," The definitions of earlier revenue acts have been sub&-
stantially the same. In 1917 the Treasury.Department ruled
that a lessor realized income at the end of, the term to the
extent of the depreciated value.of revertible improvements
erected by a lessee. T. D. 2442 Reb. 6, 1917. This ruling
was the basis of Treas. Reg. 33 (revised), Art. 4,.par. 50(Act of 1916, as amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1917) 'and! Art. 48
of Reg. 45 (Act of 1918). These Regulations wexre invalidated
by-Miller v. Gearin (C.C.A. 9th,.1919) 2b8 F. 225, cert. den.
(1919) 250 U. S. 667, which held that a lessor realized no
taxable income when in 1916, upon default of a lessee, he
took possession of a building erected by the lessee in 1907.
See also Cryan v. Wardell .(D. C. Cal. 1920) 263 F. 248. Both
cases contained dicta that the enhancement of value resulting
from erection of the buiLdings constituted income upon com-
pletion of the improvements. The Treasury Department in 1920
accordingly ruled:
'When buildings are erected or improvements:are.made
by a lessee in pursuance of an agreement with the
lessor, and such: buildings or improvements are not
subject to removal by the lessee, the lessor receives
income at the time such buildings or improvements are
completed, to the extent of the fair market price or
-value of such buildings or improvement s bject to the
Jldale.
,7 fl. 3062, 3Cum. Bull. 109 (1920). See Mim. 2714, 4 Cum.
all. 90 (.1921). This ruling .has been continued in all
re lations and has constituted one of three *a1ternative pro-
Vedred uncler Trias.. Reg. 101, Art. 22 .(a) -. 13.<of the Revenue
S at f 1938 (incorporatin6 provisions of Art. 48 f Treas.
2(1921. Rdge 65 (1924) and Reg. 69 (1926) Art. 63 of
64 (1928) And Reg. 77 (1932), and Art. 22(aS-13 of Treas.
8 (1934) and Reg. O6 (1936).
The txqayEft had the option of reporting the present value
hd impeovdments, of spreading the depreciated value over
5term of the lease and reporting an aliquot portion each
~ oa~pr Qf rveport~ing.the entire value of the improvements
pltion. 'fhe regulations, were upheld in Kentucky
Ca3. Vo. L\bcas (D., C. Ky. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 266 (re'-
Mdaitions 'to miners' houses by lessee of coal mine)
aro ed by dicta in U. S. v. Boston & Providence
.'Q C. A. 1st 1930) 37 F.($d) 670 and Crane v.
~'C. 4. A. lst 934) 68 F.(2d) 640..
0-1 fr
The theory was dea.lt a reliminary blow in Hewitt Realt
Co. v. Commissioner9 6 which held that imorovements erected
by a lessee became merged with the fee under the law of
fixtures, and the lessor therefore realized no taxable income
therefrom until sq.le of the fee. Nevertheless the Treasury
refused to adopt this holding and the Dord-of Tax Appeals
continued to uphold its regulations. 9 7
In M. E, B1ntt Co. m. U. A. 98 the court undermined
the theory followed by the Treasury Department by holding
that an aliquot portion of the estimated depreciated value
at the expiration of the lease, of improvements erected by
a lessee pursuait to the requirements in the lease but not
as rent, did not constitute taxnble income to the lessor in
the first year of the lense when the improvements were
96 (C. C. A. 2d 1935) 76 F (2d) 880, 98 A.L.eR. 1201, 1207.
According to this case revertible improvements add to the
markxet value of the 'fee during the lease only bwen a urchaser
believes such imaorovements will hqve vplue at the 'xoiration
of the lease. See concurring opinion offJustice Stone in the
principal case. See also Hilgenberg v. U. S. (D. C. Md. 1937)"
21 F. Suo.' 453 (erection of imorovements not required by
lease); English v, Bitgood (D. C. Conn. 1938) 21 F. SupD, 641
(erection of building by lessee required by lease); 'Staples v.
U. S. (D. C. Pa. 1937) 21 F. SuDP. 737 (voluntary efection of'
improvements) and Dominick v. U. S. CD. C. N. Y. 1938) 24 F. i
Supp. 829. Contrast Camobell v. U. S. CD, C. Haw. 1938).
4 OCH Federal Thx Service, par.9408 (1938).
97 SImok v. Comnr. (1937) 35 B.T,A. 271' Morphy v. Commnir
(1937) 35 B.T.A. 289' Sloan v. Comnr. (19375 36 B.T.A. 370;
Hart v. Commr, (19385 37 ie.T.A. 360,
8 (1938) 305 U. S. 267, reversing (Ct. Cl. 1938). 23-
Sum. 461. Mr. Justice Stdne c'oncurred in the holding,
held concurrence in the dicta,
w*46*o
Completedo In its view the improverents did not constitute
additional'rent, as*the Couit of Claims. had held, and the
lessor did not therefore realize any taxable.income upon
their completion.
The logical conclusion of such a view would ordinarily
be that had the improvements been made as rentals, the lessor
would have realized taxable income.. The court, however, far
.from carrying this view to completion, leaves it dangling
without foundation by its subsequent dictum that the improve-
ments are indistinguishable from improvements made by a
lessor, and therefore cQnstitUte "an addition-to capital;
not income within the meaning of the statute" 9 if that
were true they would. never be .designated as rent for the
lessor would not subject himself to a tax liability which
he might as easily avoid. If improvements are additions
100to capital, they are unrealized gains and not income,1and
they are not transformed into income by the magic of
nomenclature. .It is therefore difficult to follow the
reasoning of the court that the improvements in question
are not taxable income because they are not rentals, in the
liht of its dictum that they are not taxable income because
they are addition~s to capital.
Although the court cited Eisner v. 1aobr01for
~5 up. Ot. 186, 190.
4" ~ee v. IMacomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189.
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its proposition that the improvements did not constitute
taxable income, it did not refer to income within the mean
ing of the Sixteenth Amendment, but "within the meaning of
the statute." Yet section 22a of the Revenue Act of 1932
followed the Sixteenth Amendment in -Iefining gross income
to include "income from any source whatever", and Congress,
by repeated re-enactment of the statute, impliedly approved
102the Treasury Regulation1 which rendered such gains as
those represented by the improvements in the instant case
taxable under the statute. As the statutory definition
could hardly be broader, or Congressional approval of it
more consistent, the court's limitation of the definition
seems to run counter to the manifest intent of Congress.103
The court took issue not only with the theory that
improvements not made as rents represented taxable income to
the lessor, but with the method of determining the hypothetica
value of the improvements upon reversion by estimating their
depreciation from the original cost. In its own view the
value of such improveMients at the end of the lease must be
determined by attributing to then a proportion of the value
102 101 Art. 22 (a)'13e See Helvering v. Reynolds Tobaco
Co. (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 423. If Treasury ReCulations are conw
clusive regarding exclusion of income once Contr inal
approval is givenbyrencmn thywudsmeqal o
clusive regardIng .nlso o noe
10 Of. Irw;in v.Gvi (12)28US.1Jwihr ot
Congress's intentio intervnelw toeahgns
profits and income o vr ecito nessei~a1
a)1xeeeHevript.RenoddTbac
of the fee-or structure of which they form a part.104 Since
estimating the future value of improvements in this m anner
would result in figures as conjectural as the estimated
depreciated value of the improvements alone, with attendant
105
administrative difficulties the Treasury would be virtually
compelled to forego imposition of the tax during the term of
the lease.106
By dictum the court stated that even if the value of
the improverents upon termination of the lease were established
it would not constitute income during the first year of the
lease, for the acquisition of the reversion in the improve-
ments "did not amount to contemporaneous realization of
gain within the meaning of the statute." The same reasoning
could apply to each year of the lease ai d implies that the
104
The assumption is that the value of an improvement
inheres in its adaptAtion to the realty. .Its salvage value,
the excess of its value as an article severed from the build-
ing over its cost of removal, is as a rule relatively small.
105 The cost of a building is-normally a fair approximation
of its value at the d ite of completion. Because of intervening
depreciation, however, its value at the expiration of a lease
is coinjectural. Not only would the Treasury Department have
the burden of inspecting the premises and reaching an estimate
of future values but it might under the principal case have
the burden of proving that the figure reached was not con-
j ectural.
106
The improvements could not be evaluated 'upon their com-
pletion since their value would have tc be determined. in con-
junction with the -value of the whole fece upon reversion. The
present worth of the future -reversionary vjlue of. the improve-
ments could likewise not be determ~ined under the ~present pro-
cedure, which is baused on depreciated value of the improve-
menits alone upon reversion. Nor coeuld an aliquot portion of
the estimated future reversionary value of the improvements
alone be assigned to each year of the lease.
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lessor realizes no,gain before the termination of the
107lease.
It is suggested that realization may not even occur
until sale of the fee, on the theory of Hewitt RealtY 00.
v. Commissioner.108 The adoption of that theory would call
into play the ccurtIs formal distinctions between capital
and income. Under the law of fixtures, revertible improve-
mernts erected by a lessee become one with the land and possess
their principal value only in relation to it. If the fee is
considered as the capital res, improvements appreciate its
value without basically changing the asset of the lessor,
The tax would be deferred, but night ultimately be imposed
at higher rates on that account with fewer difficulties of
adminis tration.
It must be remembered that the Blatt decision is
merely a ruling on the facts, and that the majority opinio
together with Mr. Justice Stone's separate opinion, give
evidence that the court's members were sharply at issue as
to the grounds on which to rest their decision. It is to
be hoped that the Treasury will develop a conflict between
the circuit courts on the issue of the realization of inei0
17T
See Lucas v. American Code Co. (1930) 280 U. S8 48~
Burnet v. Logan (1931) 283 U. S. 404, U. S. v. Safety Car
Heating & L. Co. (1936) 297 U. S. 88, all cited by thl owt
in the instant case. Cf. U. S. v. S. S. White Dlental ~o
(1927) 283 U. 5. 398.
108
(C. C. A. 2d 1935) 76 F.(2d) 880, A. LA 1201,
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where the lessor comes into possession of the improvements.
110
In lyeth v. Hoey property received by an heir in
compromise of a will contest was held exempt from income tax
as #property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritr
anc e.u The court determined that the question as to whether
petitioner acquired property by "inheritance" within the mean-
ing of the federal statute was not governed by local law,112
and held that the property was inherited by petitioner
109
The freeing of this asset ffom an oblicgation to permit
another to use it might justify treating the value of the
improvements as independent income at this time, apart from
the value of the land itself. Compare U. S. v. Kirby Lumber
Co. (1931) 284 U. S. 1, Kelvering v. American Chicle Co. (1934)
291 U. S. 426.
Meanwhile the lover courts seem to regard themselves as
bound to hold that the lessor does not realize income when he
comes into possession of valuable improvements through the
premature termination of a lease. Nicholas v. Fifteenth
Street Investment Co. (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) 105 F.(2d) 289,
Helvering v. Brunn (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105 F.(2d) 442. The
Board of Tax Appeals has likewise refused to follow the
Treasury Regulations since the Blatt decision. Cleveland
Trust Co. v. Commr. (-1939) 39 B.T.A. No. 18; Merkra Holding
Co. v. Commr. (1939) B.T.A. No. 19.
110 (1938) 59 Sup. Ct. .155. The Circuit Coqrt of-Appeals
for the Second and Fourth Circuits had differed on the proper
treatment of the problem here involved. See Lyeth v. Hoey
(1938, C. C. A. 2d) 96 F.(2d) 141 and Magruder v. Segebade
(1938, C. C. A. 4th) 94 F.(2d) 177. See Paul, Zimet and Paul,
Selected Studies in Federal Taxation, Second Series p. 305-330.
Sec. 22(b) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1932.
112 The lower court held controlling the Massachusetts rule
Sto the effect that compromise settlements are derived by
6, *otxaot and not by inheritance. See Notes in (1939) 14
>Iidia~aL. J. 270 and (1939) 19 Eoston U. Law Rev. 335
$? adiscussion of this pha.se of the decision.
~51-
because he took as an 1:eir "in spite of the will and as i
the case of intestacy. . . the compromise serving to re-,
111
pro tanto the impediment to his inheritance.*
Gain or loss must be computed on the basis of what
is actually sold and not what is intended to be sold. In
Davidson v. Commissioner114a taxpayer directed his broker
to make two sales of certain lots of stocks. Each time the
bank which held the stock certificates as collateral delive
to the broker certificates other than those ithad been
instructed to deliver. The court held that the taxpayer's
ain on the sale is to be determined on the basis'of the
cost of the certificates actually delivered. "His intentioi
to sell, even when coupled with his order to theb
direction to the bank, cannot be held to constitute
. . . The case is not different fr6m what it would
been, if petitioner himself had delivered to the brokr tbh
certificates sent by the bank. ... The G6mmisidneright
computed gain on the basis of what was gone rather h ch
what petitioner intended td do.r
113 14In renderinGits dectalon "upon this ba t. I$e
avoided the questiod vwhether amounts received in
of a will contest constitute income within 1*e ag
the Sixteenth Amendment. See Eisner v. Maoq b . (c
U. S. 189, 207, and Stratton's Independenqq ,H
231 U. S. 399. This question might ari eqNht
of a contest involvin, claimantte heirit-
be established that prdperty so zreqeir
inheritance without first esdtbihA 3 mat
troversy, i, e.. that the claimant a
114 ( 1938) 59 Sup. Ct. 43~
Fairbanks v. United States 115 presented the question
whether the redemption of bonds before maturity by the
issuing corporation was a sale or exchange within the mean"
ing of section 208(a)(1) of the 1926 Act and section 101(c)(1)
of the 1928 Act, which rendered a bondholder's Uain from
retirement of the bonds a capital gain subject to the 1212
percent rate imposed by those acts. It was held that pay-
ment and discharge of a bond is neither a sale nor exchange
within the commonly accepted meaning of the words, and that
the bain constituted ordinary income. The change in the
Revenue Act of .1934, Section 117(f), providing that amounts
received on retirement Qf bonds shall be considered amounts
received in exchange therefor, was found to be a material
addition and not an attempt to construe prior acts. 1 1 6
The proper basis for determining the amount of deduction
for uncompensated losses from damage to non-business property
117
-has long been a controversial Subject by reason of certain
inconsistent provisions of the Revenue Act of 1934. Tn
115. (1939) 50 Sup. Ct. 607.
116
Until this change the taxpayer could sell the bond just
before its maturity date and thus have the transaction treated
as a sale or could retain the bond until redemption and thus
be:taxd A 1the basis of ordinary gain or loss wichever
was to his advantage..
11'?
,See (1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 816, for a discussion of
the history of this probleni..
118Helvering v. 0Owens the court repudiated the literal
meaning of these provisions as contrary to the intent of
Congress and held that a taxpayer whose pleasure automobile
was damaged in a collision could deduct only the amount of
the actual damage, namely, the difference between the
depreciated value immediately before the accident and the
value immediately thereafter.
The actual damage amounted to only $35, but'the tax-.
payer contended that since he was allowed no depreciation
on his automobile,:1 1 9 its original cost was, under section
23(h) of the Revenue Act of 1934,120 the proper basis for
determining the amount of loss. He therefore claimed a
deduction of .'%1,635, the difference between the cost of the
automobile, $1,825,Pand the value immediately after the
collision,11190.
(1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 260. Obici v. Helvering, involving
the same problems, was decided at the same time and covered-
by the same opinion. Neither party disputed that collision
is a -casualty. See Shearer v. Andersen (C. C. A. 2nd 1927)
16 F(2d) 995; G. C. M. 1802, VI-L Cum. Bull. 219 (1927); of.
Clinton Graham (1925) 1 B. T. A. 775, Charles' No Burch (1926)
4 B. T. A. 604 and 0. D. 629, 3 Cum. Bull. 158 (1920), 4 Cum.
Bull. 160 (1921). In the Obici case a boat, boathouse and
pier used solely for pleasure were totally destroyed by storm
There was no dispute that this was a casualty. The court
denied the taxpayer's claim that the original cost was the
basis of the deduction.
19Art. 23 (1)-2 of Re{;ulations 86 provides that ]'The de4z
tion of an allowance for depreciation is limited to propert
used in taxpayer's tr'ade or business. No such~ allowazie t
be made in respect of automobiles or other vehicles used
solely for pleasure. . . ."
120 This section provides that the basis for determining~
*A*54dwo
The claim was so.plausible under the literal pro
visions of the Act that the court was able to deny it only
by denying that these provisions expressed the intent of
Congress. Subsection e(3) of Section 23 allowed the tax-
payer to make a deduction for a casualty loss of non-
business property sustained during the taxable year.
Subsection (h) provides that. the amount of the deduction
shall be determined on the adjusted basis set forth in
section 113 (b) applicable to losses from the sale or
other disposition of all property. The very fact that
non-business property was allowed no depreciation made it
fall, under the terms of Section 113 (b), within the scope
of section 113 .(a), and served paradoxically to enable
the taxpay.er to claim a deduction of' all of the depreciation
which had ever accrued. The adjusted basis in this case,
thus became by reference the unadjusted basis set forth in
section 113 (a),. for Congress, which had consistently denied
any allowance of depreciation for non-business property else-
where in the Revenue Acts, neglected to make the special
provision that was necessary here to insure that depreciation
wDtlld not be allowed in the case of loss of such property.
120 (cont.)
amount of deduction for lossssane0rmdmg
toproperty not connected with taeo uiessalb h
adJusted basis provided in sectio 1 b, Ta eto
provides for adjustments of the bssfrdpeito t
the extent allowed (but not lesstath amutlowbe
wdrthis Act or prior income tax laws?
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The result was that while the Revere Acts have also
consistently deried the allowance of losses e=cept in the
year sustained, or the allowance of any but actual loasees
the taxpayer here was able to claim a full deduction on
the basis of the original cost of non-business property
damaged by casualty, even though such property might be
of hegligible value at the time of the casualty. Even if
the actual damage of $35 had been covered by insurance, he
could still have claimed a deduction of $1600, namelY,
the cost of the autombile, $1825, less not only the
amunt of its value after the collision, $190, but .tb1e 104s
covered by insurance, $35.
The curious loophole in the Act resulted less from
negligence than from an abundance of' cautions Section, 23'(0
not being confined to non-business property, provided for
the deduction of all losses incurred by individuals and
corporations. Congress, intent upon preverting this s
section from operating to allow ary depreciation alr1ed
allowatle elsewhere in the Act to property other tha
business property, provided that all losses sho It
determined upon the adjusted basis in section (
its preoccupation with the prevention of' a opWh0
busiress.property, it opened 5p a loophole for nb
property. Had section 23(e) mot been concerned wit 1
losses besides those. to non-business .propepty, ther
have been no 'need for sectio 23(h) a the loophV
:0llowe .h the wake 6f th latter 'sectio n would have been
o b iatedo ' .
The.hiatue -in draf t'mAnship presented the court with
a dilemma. I i-t aocepted.the-conclusion compelled by a
literal readig of sections 23(h) .and 113(b) it authorized
deductions contrary to express provisions elsewhere in the
Act. When it refused.to follow this conclusion, and held
that the taxpayerls. deduction must be limited to the actual
damage to the property, it .carrie.d out the intent of-Congress
lat charged the literal meaning of the sections in question.
In effect it wrote into subsection (h) an exception of non"
business property. The Circuit Court of Appeals did the
same thing with ne boldness when it stated:
"The rule is well settled.- however, that in such
case the statute should be construed as containing such
exception.when'necessary. to avoid a consequence which
Congress clearly did not intend, Sorrells v. U. S...
(287 U. s. 435), U. S. v.-Kirby..(7 Wall. 482). As
said in the case last cited, pp. 4, 6: 'All laws should
receive a sensible construction. General terms should
. be so limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It
will always, therefore, be presumed that 1bhe legislature
M ntintended exceptions to its language, which would.avoid
results of this character. The reaso n of the law in
stuc cases should pryail over its letter."'121
.,W 3?The oeurt resolved its dilemma only to raise another,
,that the rejection of the literal wording of a
Sfraught with the danger of depriving both the
* ~ the Government of. ,ay assurance that a statute
4~S~az~~eted to mean what it says. .There IAs-a question
Obic .(40.A. 4th 1938) 97 F. (2d) 431,4330
whether the court should undertake to correct.even"the Mst
obvious of oversi hts when Congress has 'within its power the
correction, albeit del.ayed, of. its own lapses. There is
always the possibility.that Congress may have intended a
provision to apply as written despite its s-eenrigly anomalous
results.)Even more serious is the danger that neither tax*
payers nor the Bureau could rely upon the written word as
the authentic meaning o.f a given provision.
Yet it is virtually inpossible for -ongress always to
cloak its intent in unmistakable language, wheh the prottemp
on which it -must legislate are multifarious andiconplicated.
The legislative-process is a cumbersome one, and'there are
not enough skilled draftsmen available to anticipate and
eliminate all possibility of error. The revenue acts them
Sel vs, which. deal ,with the rast intricate .Problems, are
nodels of draftsmanship, a.ni they. could hardly beimproved
except at prohibitive cost. It might well 'be argued that
if the written word is .to 'be subjedt to overtones of judicial
Vv'
interpretationwhich arount to cancellation or contradiction,
the already difficult task of understanding the revenue acts
may become hopeless. Yet the.very excellence of draftsman
ship which would seem to justif A general rule of literal
interpretation tright with even nore reas-pn justifya
departure from that rule in the case of manifest err
the draftsmanship of the reverue acts were less exceIe zi$,
1922 See Eicholz, Should The. Federa.l Income Tax Be.
Simplified (1939) 48 Yale L, Jour. 1200.d
their errors would be less manifest, but inconsistencies
become glaring when they emerge from language generally
chgracterized by deliberation and care. If the intent of
Congress is clearly expressed elsewhere in the act, the
Court would seem justified in rejecting the literal meaning
of an inconsistent provision.j
Section 23 (n) of the Reverue Act of 1932, like
corresponding sections of other Reverue Acts, allows a
deduction from gross income of charitable contributions
not exceeding 15% of the taxpayer's net income before the
deduction. In United States v. Pleasants1 2 3 the taxpayer
deducted charitable.contributions in the taxable year
amountire to $3,496. The Commissioner denied the deduction
on the ground that as the taxpayer had a capital loss of
$154,921.98 which exceeded his ordinary net income of
$94,963.52, there was no net income against which to make a
deduction for contributions. The gpvernment argued that
since a capital net gain must be included in computing the
net income of the taxpayer for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the deductions for charitable contributions under
23(n) reached the 15% limit,12 4 it followed that capital
net losses must similarly be taken into account. The. court
rejected the government's contention on the ground that
123 (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 281...
124 Helvering v. Bl~.ss (1934) 293 U. S. 144.
section 23(n) referred to 3the taxp Azet
is actually 'ubj ect to tat EWe. thb, the gresa
the appplication of the apealal*pro4visidn sO~feet AeQio
for an offset in case of a. capital net loss i nterdodt'o
make the taxpayer's.net income, ascertained irrespecttWe C
that loss, the sUbject. of the taxadt that the provision 2
section 21(n) allowing a deduction for charitab:re contribt
is applicable to that taxable income*al 2 5
Theconfusion surrounding thb deductibility ot boN
discounts and expenses has yet to be entirely di8pel1ld.1U
Frequent reorganizations of corporate structures ii the 34
decade have resulted in litigation which, while stop na
short of the Supreme Court, have crowded the alendiar of'
Board of Tax Appeals and the appellate courts* F. th
decisions emerge two loosely formulated rules regardiid
right of parent corporations to deduct the unanorthsed
portion of the bond discournt and expense of subsidiarte*
which they liquidate in such a manner as to baceO 1eg
lipjble for the payment of the bonds of the abi1 1
If the liquidation and transfer of aegets repett
merger or consolidation under state law, the Oht1
corporation is permitted to deduct, idume Itxe
125 59 Sup. Ct. 281, 284.
126 See Paul and Mertens aWoex1
vol. 1, 1938 Supp., p. 195 et seq
mezr'ed corporation's bonds, the unamortized portion of the
bond discount and expense incurred by the merged corporation.
If the liquidation and transfer of assets represints a re"
organization in which the continuing corporation assumes
liability for the bonds by contract and not ad a matter of
law, the deductions are not permitted.127
In Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., Helvering v.
Pensylvania Water and Power C0. 1 2 8 and General Ga-s and
Electric Cor . Commissionerl 2 9 the Supreme Court appears
to recognize and approve these rules in so far as it grounds
its decisions as to deductibility on a determination in each
case of whether the merger or consolidation in question was
a de facto or a de fure merger under Pennsylvania law. While
observing the distinction implicit in these rules, however,
the court takes no cognizance of the fact that the distinction
127 American Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioner (1936, C. C.
A. 2d) 85 F. (2d) 527; see 1 Paul & Mertens, op. cit., p. O200
et seq. Wkile this distinction may not be Wise as a matter
of policy, because it breeds litigation and is not founded on
real differences, its appearance is not surprising when it is
remembered that the whole-Question of bond discount.has been
left open by. the statute. The distinction is founded on the
difficulty of permitting one corporation to deduct another's
expense when the statute does not. so Provide. Hence the
distinction was evolved be~teeh mergers and consolidations,
where the old corporatioh isa Acomponent part of the new, and.
other reorganiz"ations where the old corporation sells out to
another and expires, or continues separate from the purchaser.
128 (18)59 Sup. Ct. 634
-o61..-
originates in concepts of state law, which vary from state to
state. 1 30 The Revenue Act in its silence cannot be interwo
preted as resting either expressly or impliedly on these
concepts. The Supreme Court has held elsewhere in the same
term1 31 that differences of local law are not controlling and
that distinctions based thereon are not to be recognized in
the administration of the Revenue Act. Such differences can
exist to an exceptional degree since theright to form and
merge corporations, together with the right to leave property
to one's heirs at death, are subject to greater state control
than any other rights. The question is therefore still open
whether the Supreme Court will hold that, in the absence of
any requirement in the Revenue Act that state laws pontrol,
the deductibility of unamortized bond discount and expense,
like the exemption of bequests, is to be determined without
reference to distinctions based on local law.
The specific language of section 115(c) of the Revenue
Act of 1928,132 its legislative history, the judicial
130 The court states the opposing contentions of counsel and
adds: "The question, then, is solely one respecting the law
of Pennsylvania." However, the cases were presented to the
court on that basis, counsel conceding the validity of the
distinction referred to supra note 127.
131 Lyeth v. Hoey (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 155.
132 "Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corpOz
ation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for tz
stock, and amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a
corporation shall be treated as 'in part or full payment jn
exchange for the stock. The gain or loss to the distribte
resulting from such exchange shall be determined unde' ist*
construction of the section as it.appeared in the 1918
Act, 1 3 3 the reports of the Congressional Committee,134 and
the repeated reenactment of the section with the consequent
adoption of the long-standing Treasury Regulation1 3 5
constitute an unusually solid basis for the court's decision
in White et al exrs. v. United States, 1 3 6 that a stockholders
loss on the liquidation of a corporation is a capital loss,
the deduction of which is subject to the capital loss
provisions.
A long needed decision dispelling confusion in the
important field of taxpayers' remedies was rendered in
United States v. Bertelsen & Petersen Eneering Co. and
132 (Cont.)111 but shall be recognized only to the
extent provided in section 112. . ." The same language is
found in the corresponding provision of' subsequent revenue
acts.
133 See section 201(c) of 1918 Act, held in Hellmich v.
Hellman (1928) 276 U. 8. 233 to require a stockholder's
gains upon liquidation to be treated as gains from the sale
of property.
134 See Report of Senate Committee on Finance Report No.
398, 68 Cong. lt Sess., and Report of the House Ways'and
Means Committee, Repprt No. 178, 68th Cong. 1st Sess.,
discussing section 201 (c) of the 1924 Act the relevant
portion of which is identical with section 115 (c) of the
1928 Act,
165 Article 1545 of Regulations 65 and 69, Article 625
of Regulations 74 and 77.
158 1938 5 Sup.Ct. 79.See also Helvering v. Chester
E. Wave Co (198) 9 Sp.Ot. 185, involving the same
prc~emunder the 1934 Act.
United States v. d. T. affr t g
Commissioner's crediting of an overpayment one
against an alleged deficiency for another year aoUnt0 to
disallowance, to the extent of the credit, of the afr
refund for the first year, and that suit may be brouiht for
the disallowance of that claim without filing another 1ai
for refund. Until this decision it was uncertain becAuse
of conflicting lower court decisions13 8 whether erediting
an overpayment amounted to an account stated, to disallowiant
of the claim for refund or to payment for the year against
which the credit was applied. There was corresponding
uncertainty as to whether the- taxpayer Thould one uponfan
account stated, or upon the claim-for-refund, or shouI f
another claim and sue for the refund of the pdyment b
of creCit for the year against which the credit was ajppI4
As different periodsof limitation existed for each reled
the taxpayer found himself without any remedy ,tf he-de;,I
guess correctly as to vhich one he must urs4te,
139'The issue in the instant oases centered upon
jurisdiction of the District Courts, Thesce
4 a aft M V P-14
(1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 541.
18See 5 Paul & Ifertens 951.. j
In- the Bertelsen case, mrore.
overpayment upon 191L7 taxes was oe T
deficiency for 1918 taxes thee nr&yth at
limitations. As only the questiontJI X 4
the court did not consider whether~
jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims for the
recovery of internal revenue taxes in the case of claims
140against the United States not exceeding 810,000 and for
claims exceeding $10,000 if the collector of internal
revenue by Whom the tax was collected is dead or out of
office at the time the suit is corcmmnced. With one ex-
ception, the credits involved in these cases exceeded
$10,000 and the collectors were either dead or out of
office at the time the suits were conmmenced. The court
sustained the District Court's jurisdiction and rejected
the contention that credits of overpayments of certain
years against alleged deficiencies of others amounted to
pay-.ent for the years against which they were applied and
139 (cont.)
constituted a defense to the claim for refund of the over-
payment of taxes for 1917. See 5 Paul & Mertens 95.34
for discussion of cases holding that an overpayment cannot
be credited against a barred deficiency. As to credits
made after the effective date of the 1928 Act, I. R. C.
section 3775(a) (section-609 of the -Revenue Act of 1928)
provides: "Any credit against a liability in respect of
any taxable year shall be void if any payment in respect
of such liability would be considered an overpayment under
section 607." In Rosenstadt & Waller v. Uhited States (Ct.
C18. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 287, the Court of Claims red.ected the
contention that this section converted a credit of an over-
payment of taxes for one year.into an overpayment for the
year against which the credit was applied. The cases
discussed in the text involved credits made before the
effective date of section 609 of the Revenue Act of 1928
so that the effect of that .ection ws not before the. court.
The convincing opinion of the Cour~t of Claims makes it doubt-
ful that the Suprerme Court will find any language in section
800 of the Revenue Act of 1928 which would lead it to dis-
a~nish the Bertelsen and Jaffray cases.
V ~ ~ uoker Act, U. S. C. A. Title 28, sec. 250 (1).
the contention that as it was the Commissioner and not the
collector who made the credits the District Court was with-
out jurisdiction. The court sustained the holding of the
Circuit Court of Appeals that the suit sought to recover
overpayments made to the collector regarding which timely
claims for refund had been filed. It approved the declaration
of the court below that "The crediting of the overpayiments,
by the Commissioner, against taxes due from the taxpayer for
other years was a matter of defense, a justification for the
failure to refund, and not a matter which destroyed the tax-
payerts cause of action or ousted the court of jurisdictionUl1 4 1
An action by an Internal Revenue agent pursuant to
142
section 3173 of the Revised Statutes to compel a witness
to testify was held in McC one v. United States14 3 to be a
144
civil and not a criminal proceeding. Accordingly, as
a judgment of contempt for failure to testify was governed
by the statutory rules of civil appeals the petitioner's
appeal was properly dismissed by the Cogrt of Appeals for
non-compliance with those rules. The test followed by the
141
59 Sup. Ct. 541, 543.
142
I. R. C. section 3615.
13(1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 685..
144 In Interytate Commerce Commission v. Brimson (1894) 15
U. S. 447, relied upon by the court in this case, an action
by the Interstate Commerce Commission to compel a witneB t$
testify was -held to be a civil procebding.
oourt in distinguishing civil from criminal contempts is
thus succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Black: "A contempt
is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial,
serves only the purposes of the complainant and is not a
.145deterrent to offenses against the public." The action
in the present case met this test because judicial assist-
ance was invoked solely to obtain the petitioner's testimony,
"to buttress the procedure for collection of taxes and not
'in'vindication f the public justice' as in criminal cases'1l46
An intricate question of statutory interpretation
involving the limitation period upon assessment under the
Revenue Act of 1926 in the case of a transferee of a transferee
of a taxpayer came before the court in United States v. Con-
147tinental National Bank and Trust Company. As the 1926 Act
did not specifically provide any limitation period for such
case the answer had to be derived from implications to be
found in the specific provisions of that act relating to
transferee liability. The basic provision, section 280(a),
provides that the liability of "a transferee of property
of a taxpayer in respect of the tax" shall be assessed,
collected and paid in the same manner and subject to the.
same limitations as. in the case of a deficiency in a tax.
There t~ o mention of a transferee of a transferee either
iV M,) Slp. Ct. 1308.
in this section or in section 280(b)(1) providig'that'
transferee liability must be assessed within one year from
expiration .of the period of limitation for assessment gani
the taxpayer. Such a, person is within the scope of these p'o
visions, therefore, either because the statute contemplates
no distinction.between a transferee of property of a taxw
payer and a transferee of such transferee or because a
preceding transferee is regarded as a taxpayer under section
280(a) on principles applied in the Updike case,148 and his
transferee is accordingly Ia transferee of property of a
taxpayer."
Under the first alternative the limitation period in
the case of a transferee of a transferee would be the same
as in the case of an initial transferee. Under the second
there would be an additional year after the expiration of
the period of limitattion for assessment against the precedi6
transferee. The period under the second alternative might
be considerably longer than under the first not only because
of the additional year for each precedirt transferee but
148 (1930) 281 Us.. 489, In this case the courtz*eJeet
the governmentis contention that section 280 di feren4
between taxpayers and transferees holding that a trans-n+6 O
was a' taxpayer within the plain words of section~ 88()0 .
and as such entitled to the benefit of the six yearpt'
limitation upon collection under section '278(a), Theo~zt
does not purport to overrule the Updike~ case although'
difficult to see how a transferee cn consistently b#
be a taxpayer for the purpose. of one statte of li
i.e. section 278(d) and held not to be a taxpayert
purpose of' another statute oft.11itaLti~onse h.ast* Ia
280(b)(1), particularly when thQ cntrolling pro0i
section 280(a) is the same in b:. t a
because of waivers of the statute of limitations or siuspen-
sion thereof as in the instant case durinG the' pendency
'leBoad f T.YAperas.149of deficiency proceeding s in the Board of Ta Appeals.
The court adopted the first alternative and held the
action in this. case barred because not brouGht within one
year after the expiration of the period of limitation for
assessment against the oriGinal taxpayer. ITr. Justice Stone,
dissentin , with whom Mr. Justice Black concurred, advanced
the second alternative as beinG compelled by the Updike case.
Under this alternative the action.would have been timely
because of the suspension of the statute arising from the
deficiency proceedings in the Board of Tax Apreals with
respect to the initial transferee.
150
The 1928 and subsequent Revenue Acts specifically
fix the assessment period with respect to the liability of
a transferee of a transferee. The decision in this case
therefore is of significance primarily in connection w-rith
transferee liability under the 1926 Act. An important
dictum in the court's opinion, however, may be of additional
interest. The initial transferee in this case died while
the proceeding with respect to his liability was penifing in
the Board of Tax Appeals. Some twenty-two months after
his death the Board made a order of redetermination in the
amount proposed by the Commissioner with interest. During
Revenue Act of 1926, section 277(b), 274(a).
the following month the Commissioner made a jeopardy
assessment against the deceased in the amount fixed by
the Board. The court rejected the government's contention
that it had six years under section 278(d) from the time
of that assessment to brinG suit against thie testator's
transferees o-n the ground that no assessment was made
against them and that section 278(d) was not broad enough
to impose liability upon them on account of the assessment
against the testator. The court vent on, however, to point
out that in any event the jeopardy assessment was made too
late. The suspension of the statute pending the deficiency
proceedings in the Board does not continue indefinitely
after the death of the petitioner where no substitution is
made, and the Commissioner had allowed more than a reasonable
time to elapse without obtaining a dismissal of the proceedw
ings for lack of a necessary party or want of prosecution.
The definition of gross income has been re-enacted
without change by Congress in all the revenue acts, and
its broadness has &iven rise to numerous interpretative.
151Treasury regulations, authorized by the acts themselves.
152From 1920 until 1934, there. existed a regulation which
interpreted the definition as not inclusive Of gains to a
corporation from the purchase or sale of its own stock,
151
I. R. C. section 62.
152 SSee Reg. 74, Art. 66.
-70...
and this regulation applied uniformly to the revenue acts
from 1913 to 1932. In 1934 it ;!as axiended by the Treasury
to make such gains taxable income, and subs equently the
definition of gross income was reenacted unchanged in the
Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1938.
153
Helvering V. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. involved
the question whether the amendment, in changing the interpre-
tation of the statutory definition of dross income, in effect
repealed the original ret)ulation with regard to the gains
realized by a corporation in 1929 from the sale of its own
stock which it had purchased over several preceding years.
The Court held that the original regulation had the force
of law, by virtue of the implied approval conferred upon it
by Congress in the repeated re-enactment in the revenue
acts of the definition of gross income which the regulation
interpreted.
The Commissioner argued that the broad statutory
definition of gross income represented the intent of Congress
to tax all that is constitutionally income, and its scope
could not therefore be restricted by interpretative regu
!lations.1 54 The Court agreed with the court below that the
nature of such :ains as those in question was debatable
13(1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 423.
154This argument had the support of Koshland v. Helvering
(1936) 298 U. S. 441, and Manhattan etc. Co. v. Commissioner
enough to warrant interpretati.ve regulations. In the
court's view the regulation that they were not income was
controllinC. with regard to tax liability for the years in
which it was in force, and the reenactment of the same
statutory definition of income in the -Revenue Acts of 1936
and 1938 did not imply ConLres lonal approval-of the
retroactive application of the amended regulation. 1 5 5
In view of the statutory provisions for the retro-
active a)plication of regulations,156 and the fact that the
original regulation promulgated in 1920 was retroactive,
it would seem that the Court forbade the retroactive
application of the amended regulation not because it lacked
Conjressional ap)roval, but because its interpretation of
the statutory definition of income was preceded by a con"
flicting interpretation which had also received Congressional
approval. If the Treasury had elected to make no interpre-
tation before 1934, its interpretation in 1934 might have
been held applicable to the particular gains in question.
If it had elected to make no interpretation at any time,
it might likewise have been free to require payment of tax
on the gains under the broad statutory definition of income.
Broad as the definition was, the Treasury was authorized
but not compelled1 to interpret it, a~nd a certain irony
attaches to the fact th> t if it exercises its authority to
C5 f. Lorrissey v. Commissioner (1935)96U..44
156 I. 3., C., section 379(b0).
9-*72
interpret in one year, it may thereby constrict its freedom
to do so in another. It is a paradoxical situation that the
later interpretation should yield to the earlier one when
Congress by continuing to reehact the statutory provi-sions
impliedly gives its blessihg to both of the Treasury's
conflicting regulations. 1 5 7
Earlier in the session the court, in Helvering v.
158Winmill,1 applied the rule of implied Congressional approval
by reneactment to a regulation interpreting brokers' come
missions for purchasing stock as part of the cost of the
stock to be added to the basis. The regulation was upheld
on the ground that it had been continued unchanged since
1916, and repeated reenactments without change of the
statutory sections which it interpreted signified Congressional
approval thereof. In this case neither the Treasury nor
Congress wished to change the regulation, and since it was
an admissible interpretation of the law there was every
reason for the court to uphold it. There would seem to be
no less compelling reasons to respect the wishes of the
Treasury and Congress to change a regulation as to respect
their wishes not to change it.
157 SThe court has already relied on implied Congressional
* approval of its own decisions. Hecht v. Malley (1924) 265
* U. 8. 144, and of lower court decisions, United States-v.
Ryan (1931) 284 U. S. 167.
1se
59 Sup. Ct. 45.
"73~.
The question remains open whether the original regla
tion would be superseded by the amended regulation with
regard to a corporation t sLains from dealings in its own
stock realized subsequent to the amendment. The question
may soon be settled since the court has [ranted certiorari in.
a series of cases involving the doctrine of Congressional
159
approval by reenactment. Its language in the instant case
sug-ests that the doctrine will not be followed so mechanioall,
that approval of an administrative interpretation in one periOd
of time will forever congeal it into a statute. The whole
purpose of flexible statutory provisions would be destroyed if
they were harshly bound by interpretations that had once
received Congressional approval, and it is hardly conceivable
that if Congress can approve one interpretation, it cannot
in time withdraw its approval from that interpretation by
conferring it upon another.
FEDEBAL ESTATE TAX
It is common knowledge that an estate tax is an
excise imposed upon the transfer of property at death nd
159 Ambassador Petroleum Zo.v. Commissioner C.CA. h
1936) 81 F.(2d) 474. Helvering v. Bandini Pet~ Co.z kih
Oil Co., and Wilshire Annex Oil Co. (1939) 59 Sup. Gt, ?7He
Commissioner v. F. H. E. Oil Co. (C. C. A. 5th, 1939)400 ?
596, contra to these cases, will alsQ b1e eoasioze
160
59 Sup. Ct. 423, 426.
is no.t a tax upon the property. Federal bonds exempt
by statute from all taxation have been held subject to a
federal inheritance tax,162 and federal bonds exempted by
state taxation in any form have been held subject to state
inheritance taxes.163 It was inevitable, therefore, that
the court would hold as it did in United States Trust Co. v.
164Helverin that the proceeds of War Risk Insurance are in-
cludible in a decedent's Eross estate despite the provisions
of section 22 the World. War Veterans Act of 1924 exempting
such insurance "from all taxation", and the amendment to
that Act of August 12, 1935 providing that "Payments of
benefits due or to become due . . . shall be exempt from
taxation . . . ." The exemption of. such insurance, like that
of federal bonds, cannot be amplified into an exemption of
its transfer at death.
Tyler v. United States 1 65 Third National Bank ana
161
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 39;
Chase National Bank v. United States (1929) 278 UO S. 327,
United States v. Jacobs (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 551.
Murdock v. WYard (1900) 178 U. S. 139.
163 Plummer v. Coler (1900) 178 U. S. 115.
64(I939) 59 Sup. Ct. 692.
15(1929) 281.U. 5. 497, holding that the full value of
an estate by the entirety may constitutionally be included
in the decedent's gross estate.
Trust Co. v. White,1 66Gwinn v. Gommis he
Foster v. Commissionerl68 made inevitable the -do
169in United States v. Jacobs et a-0. upholding te so
stitutionality of section 302(h) of the Revenue Act o
1924 requiring the inclusion in the grose estate of th
decedent of the full value of property purchased with his
own funds and held with his wife under a joint tenaney
set up before the enactment of the estate tax in 1916
The majority found that technical !ifferences between aoint
tenancies *atPd tenancies by the entirety too insubstantial
170to distin guish the first two cases and there was nothing
166 (1932) 287 U. . 577, holding that- the full value of
the property passing to a survivor under a tenancy by the
entirety created prior to the estate tax of 1916 could be
included in the gross estate. Accord, Helvering V. Bowera
(1938) 303 U. S. 618.
167 (1932) 287 U. S. 224, holding that estate tax may co
stitutionally apply to half of a joint tenancy areated pr,-
to the adoption of the estate tax, where the decedent alot
had furnished consideration for the joint propeety 4,f
Griswold v. Helvering (1933) 290 U. 8. 56.
1688 (1938) 303 U. 8, 618, holding that Congres may pev
stitutionally apply the estate tax to the W",le of a in
tenancy created after the enactment of the estate te
19 (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 551.
170 Although the differences in the types
have their origin in an "amiable fictioi ~F
intricate distinctions of cdmmon l1aw ~propert 4
are of considerable practical imlpor9
dissenting Justices MoReynolds, 3ut~
tenant can destroy the joint estate,
his interest or otherwise obtaith
by entirety cannot. It was conten
in the last two to militate against taxing the full value
of the property of a joint tenancy created before the
enactment of the estate tax act.
The tax was not retroactive because the death, which
was the generating source of the shift in economic interest
Giving rise to the tax, occurred after the adoption of the
taxing act, just as it did in Foster v. Commissioner, and
the cases are, therefore, indistinguishable in this respect
even though the joint tenancy in one was created before and
in the other after the enactment of the tax. There was no
undue hardship in either case since at any time before the
death the joint tenancy could have been severed and the
tax avoided.
The complaint was not that no part of the value of
the survivorl-s half interest should be included in the
decedent's gross estate but th:t too much of that value
was included. The property rights that vere brought into
being or ripened for the survivor with respect to her half
interest vere the right to dispose of her half interest
by:.will or to allow it to pass to her heirs, end the right
170 (cons.)
surviving joint tenant receiVes nthini i ore th-Athc doner
hlf interest and that no more can b subject to a
death duty. This argum-nt which would be equally applicable
to join t tenancies crcated after the adoption of the taxing
act, was rejected in Foster v. Commissioner, supra. There is
little force to the argument that: an estate tax is not
materially different fromi~ gmift tax .with date of payment and
computseion of rate postponed, and that creators of joint
tenancies after the enactu~ent of the tax are forewarned as
crea ors of previously created joint tenancies cannot be. That
Lack of~war'ninig works no disadvantage in view of the power
efore decedent's death to sever the joint tenancy and avoid
the tax.*
to sell the entire property without that risk of loss which
mi&§ht have resulted from partition or'separate sale of her
interest while the decedent lived. The measure of the tax,
however, was not limited to the value of these newly ao-
quired rights but included the full value of her half interest*
This lack of complete correspondence between the subject of
the tax and its measure was disposed of by court as follows:
"It is immaterial that Congress chose to measure the amount
of the tax by a percentage of the total value of the property5
rather than by a part, or by a set sum for each such change.
The wisdom both of the tax and of its measurement was for
Con.-ress to determine.' t
171In Dimock v. Corwin, decided with the Jacobs case,
the joint tenancy was not only created before the 1916 Act
but property which the survivor had been given by the decedent
without consideration was contributed to the joint t y
Because her contribution had been acquired "from the decedent
for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or moneys worth" the full value of the joint tenancy property
was held, pursuant to section 302(h) of tbeRevenue Act of
1926, includible in the decedent's cross estate despite the
fact that the Gift.had been made before the 1916 Acto.
It has long been apparent that the provision requirin~
the inclusion of gifts in contemplation of death in the
171
(1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 556. 3
deoedent's gross estate fails of its purpose to prevent
evasion of t-e tax through substitutes for testamentary
dispositions. 1 7 9 The futility of the provision is once
more illustrated by the decision in Colorado National Bank
173of Denver et al v. Commissioner holding that an irrevocable
transfer in trust was not a gift in contemplation of death
although the decedent, while in Good health, was eighty years
old, when he made it. His dominant motive was to set aside
enough to care for his descendants after his death in the
event his stock market speculations proved disastrous. The
court's declaration that the "mere purpose to make provision
for children after a donor's death is not enough conclusively
174to establish that action as 'in contemplation of death,'"
together with its approval of the conclusion of the Board
of Tax Appeals that the facts disclosed an effective motive
ot directly springing from apprehension of death," 175
virtually limit gifts in contemplation of death to gifts
causa mortis,
The review of the evidence in Mr. Justice Black's
vigorous dfagpnting opinion clearly demonstrates that the
12See United States v. Wells (1931) 283 U. S. 102, 116,
where ther opurt in speaking of the provision states: "The
' ominanV purpose.1is to reach substitutes for testamentary
"disp~sitions and thus to prevent evasion of the estate tax.'
19081 5Sup. t~. 48.
S up. Ct.. 48, 49. Cf. Shukert v. Allen (1927) 273
t 48, 49.
donor in this case was motivated by a desire'to-provide
for his dependents after his death. The trust agreement
was substantially identical'ae to parties, recipients,
amounts, terms and conditions with a will made by the
donor two years earlier. .Neither. the will not the trust
agreement permitted any payments to the beneficiaries
176-
until the settlor's d;eath. In th.e Wells case, upon-.vhich
the majority rely, the donor's dom-inant motive was to attain
an object desirable to him during his lifetime, training
and experience for his children in ranaGins their finances,
In the instant case the contemplated speculations'of the
donor increased the importance of providing for hisiBsoendants
after his death and would seem, therefore, to emphasize rather
than distinguish the testamentary nature of the gift ini
question.
FEDERIAL EXCISE TAXES
The National Firearms Act,1 7 7 enaded in 1934 as part
of the Justice Department's campaign against crime, regulate
the importation and interstate transportation of' sawe off
shotuns, machine 'uns.and weapons other thamn-pistols and
revolvers which dischargeed shots by explosives and were
capabie of bein., concealed on the perseon, ard imnposed~ a
176 United States v. Wells (1931) 283 14 S. ,L0.
I.R.C. sections 2720-2733; 326O528
stamp tax on their transfer.
178
The court upheld the tax in United States v. Miller,
179relying on the authority of Sonzinsky v. United States
and several cases under the Harrison Narootic Actl80 for
the propocition that the Firearms Act was a revenue measure
and not a regulatory measure imposinG a penalty and usurping
power reserved to the states. More difficult was tie problem
under the Second Amendment--"A well regulated Militia being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." The
amendment was adopted because of the strong sentiment against
standing armies to assure the continuation and effectiveness
of the Militia which comprised "all males physically capable
of acting in concert for the common defense" who when called
for service were expected to appear bearing arms supplied
by themselves and of the kind in use at the time. As there
was no evidence in this case tending to show tha-,t the posses-
sion or use of a 1sawed-off shotgun" has at this time some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated Militia the court refused to hold that
the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear
such an instrument.
178 (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 816.
19(1957) 300 U. 5. 506, 513.
180 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy (1916) 241 U. 5. 394; United
States v. Doremus (1919) 240 U. 5. 86, 94; Linder' v. United
States (1925) 268 U. 5. 5; Alston v. United States (1927) 274
U. 8, 289; Negro v. United States (1928) 276 U. S. 332.
To recover cotton in the possession of a ginnter, a
producer paid a tax, imposed by the Bankhead Cotton Act,
which the collector of internal revenue assessed against
the cinner. Since a volunteer may not recover the payment
of ?anotfher's tax the auestion came before the court in
Stalhlman v. Vidal182 whether the Act imposed the tax on
the inner or the producer. The court held that the tax
vas intended to fall on the producer and as his payment was
not voluntary, but under duress of goods, he was empowered
to maintain the suit for refund even though the possibility
existed that the tax right be on the ginner.
11Act of April 21, 1934, c. 1.57, 98 Stat. 598; 7 tJ $. C
sec. 701 et seq. The Act was repealed Februairy 10, 1956 4
S tat. 1106.
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